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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing 
and Financial Management at the International Hellenic University. The purpose of this 
study was to examine the abnormal returns to shareholders of the companies engaged 
in the M&As around the day of the first public announcement. Our analysis was focused 
on M&As in the automotive sector for the period 2008-2018 and we explored whether 
the market reacted differently on horizontal M&As than on vertical ones, conducting 
the event study methodology on abnormal returns. We found that investors highly 
reacted to the announcement of a deal either positively or negatively depending on their 
expectations regarding the deal and information leakages may be the reason for the 
existence of abnormal returns before the announcement date. In the case of vertical 
M&As, positive statistically significant CAARs found in several windows for both the 
bidder and target company while in horizontal M&As negative statistically significant 
windows estimated based on market model. Finally, accounting-based analysis was 
employed to examine the post-M&A profitability performance of the acquiring firms 
based on specific financial ratios. Analysis showed that there was no statistically 
significant improvement of ROE and Profit Margin Ratio in a period of two years 
following the M&A.  
Before the presentation of our dissertation, we would like to express our deep gratitude 
to our supervisor, Dr. Grose, for his guidance and helpful comments which was vital for 
the completion of our thesis. We would also like to thank our families for their support 
during the entire process.  
KEY WORDS: automotive industry, horizontal M&As, vertical M&As, abnormal returns, 
M&A profitability performance 
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1 Introduction 
For decades now, companies from every sector, especially in the automotive, conduct 
mergers and acquisitions not only to gain competitive advantage, but also to dominate 
in the market and expand their business globally. Before we begin, although "mergers" 
and "acquisitions" refer to different types of transactions, the terms are used 
interchangeably since they both serve the same corporate purpose. 
In an M&A transaction two parties participate, the acquirer or bidder and the seller or 
target. Acquisition is the form of transaction where a firm acquires another and becomes 
the new owner of the target company. From a legal point of view, the target company 
ceases to exist, and its stock is no longer traded, while the acquirer absorbs the target 
business and its stock continues to be traded. On the other hand, a merger describes 
two firms who join forces to move forward as a single new entity, rather than remain 
separately owned and operated. Both companies' stocks are surrendered, and new 
company stock is issued in its place. A popular merger case is the merger of Daimler-
Benz and Chrysler, where both ceased to exist after the completion of the deal, and a 
new company, Daimler Chrysler, was created.  
There are also cases where target companies do not wish to be purchased. These deals 
are called “unfriendly deals” and are always considered as acquisitions. Therefore, a 
purchasing deal is classified as a merger or an acquisition, based on whether the 
purchase is friendly or hostile and how it is announced (Berk & Peter, 2017). In other 
words, the difference lies on how the deal is communicated to the target company's 
board of directors, employees and shareholders. 
There are three main categories of M&A deals, horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. 
Horizontal M&As are deals between companies that directly compete in the same 
industry. Corporate management make horizontal deals to increase market power, that 
is their market share, further utilize economies of scale, and exploit merger synergies. 
Vertical M&As are conducted between companies that operate along the same supply 
chain. A vertical M&A is the combination of companies along the production and 
distribution process of a business. The rationale behind a vertical deal includes higher 
quality control, better flow of information along the supply chain, and merger synergies.  
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In contrast to the horizontal and vertical M&As, conglomerate M&As are deals between 
companies that are totally unrelated. The biggest risk in a conglomerate merger is the 
immediate shift in business operations resulting from the merger, as the two companies 
operate in completely different markets and offer unrelated products/services. This 
attribute of conglomerate mergers usually raise concern to the investors because it 
complicates the integration procedure, thus classifying them into the least preferable 
type of merger (Berk & Peter, 2017). 
The purpose of our study is to measure the effect of M&As in shareholder’s returns of 
both the bidder and the target company in the automotive industry and understand the 
impact on the enterprise value. We also examine horizontal and vertical deals separately 
and elaborate on their comparison, in order to comprehend further the motives and 
rational behind the managerial decision regarding the M&A type. For this reason, the 
third type, conglomerate M&As, won’t be covered, due to the complications discussed 
above, so as to mainly focus to the industry components, which are better depicted in 
horizontal and vertical types. 
This research aims to examine the financial effects of M&A announcements of both 
bidder and target firms in the automotive industry, which is one of the most popular 
sectors regarding consolidation. More indicatively, our study: 
• Investigates the shareholder’s reaction to the announcement of an M&A in the 
automotive industry, during the period 2008-2018, based on the M&A type. 
• Compares the horizontal and vertical M&A deals with regards to the wealth 
effect of the shareholders of both bidder and target firms  
• Examines some profitability indicators of the acquiring companies after the 
completion of an M&A 
Based on previous studies on M&As in which target companies usually undergo higher 
abnormal returns in comparison to the acquiring companies (Capron & Pistre, 2002), we 
hypothesize that our research for automotive sector will conclude to similar results.   
The importance of our study relies on the reasons why M&A is a very popular strategic 
tool worldwide, generally in the academic, governmental, corporate and investor 
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audience. Automotive corporations tend to determine the indicators behind M&A 
success which is depicted on their shareholders’ wealth effect. M&A type consists one 
of the major indicators of integration success. The results of our study want to shed light 
on the effective choice between the different transaction types regarding the 
consequences upon both corporations’ market performance and the share price 
reaction. The latter is of outmost importance for the interest of the investors, as their 
decision determines the actual abnormal return of the companies, as well as their 
reaction on any future M&A announcement in automotive sector. Finally, governments 
and academics are concerned for the overall efficiency of the market. Excess abnormal 
returns after M&As, for instance, would raise governmental awareness concerning 
monopoly or oligopoly issues.  
For the fulfillment of the research objectives, we conducted the event study 
methodology using both market model and the market adjusted model. We therefore 
calculated the abnormal and the cumulative abnormal returns around the M&A 
announcement for both acquiring and target firms. Finally, we used the paired t-test 
analysis to examine profitability ratios of the acquiring firms comparing the figures two 
years before and two years after the M&A completion.  
Furthermore, our current study is structured as follows. To begin with, the first chapter 
includes general information on M&As, where there is also a brief presentation of our 
main research questions. Consecutively, in the second chapter we report the literature 
review regarding M&As, where a detailed analysis of horizontal and vertical deals is 
provided, as well as a deeper insight in the automotive industry transactions. In chapters 
three and four, data selection and research methodology are described. The fifth section 
includes the empirical results of the study. Finally, in chapter six, we provide the 
conclusions of the study. 
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2 International literature on M&As 
Prior research concluded that while some consolidations are characterized as successful, 
other M&As show the opposite results (Warter & Warter, 2016). However, it remains 
vague whether companies’ negative abnormal returns and reduction of shareholder’s 
value resulted from the integration or other operating factors. Special factors that 
contribute to the controversy of automotive M&As are the role of prior experience to 
M&As, the methodology of evaluating performance and cultural issues. Similar to 
Warter & Warter’s study (2016), Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford also mention little 
accurate evidence that shows the long-term effects of M&As and what makes them 
successful (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001). M&A is a multilevel, multidisciplinary, 
and multistage process which results in total or partially integration of the original 
organizations’ functions, processes and activities (Warter & Warter, 2016). 
Mergers present cyclical patterns because high volatility of merger activity usually in 
periods of economic prosperity is followed by lower volatility and fewer deals, especially 
in periods of economic contraction. This characteristic is called merger wave and it is 
influenced by multiple factors like regulation, advances in technology and economic 
environment. 
From the payment perspective, a company can be acquired with several means like cash, 
stock or a combination of these two methods. Cash payment can be used in a broader 
definition encompassing except for cash, “noncontingent liabilities, and newly issued 
notes” while stock is defined as shares with superior or inferior voting rights (Martin, 
1996) (Faccio & W. Masulis, 2005). In general, the means of payment could be very 
complicating when including additional debt instruments or options (Berk & Peter, 
2017). 
2.1 Market reaction to M&A announcement 
The market reaction on the announcement of M&As between corporations has drawn 
much attention to academics, as it provides the indicator for the value creation or 
destruction of the shareholders concerned. Most previous studies and researches show 
different effects for acquirors and targets (Ma, Chu, & Pagán, 2009), while others 
[11] 
 
examine other factors like M&A type, payment method (Wansley, Lane, & Yang, 2019). 
The researchers Ma, Chu and Pagan have noted in their study that the most reliable 
evidence on whether M&A creates value for shareholders is the studies of Andrade, 
Mitchell, & Stafford (2001), Hackbarth & Morellec (2008). 
Gains from an M&A are distributed asymmetrically between bidder and target and this 
may depend on the characteristics of the sector in which they run their business. 
Although some studies confirm synergetic efficiencies for the bidder (synergy 
hypothesis assumes reduction of costs and increase of revenues after M&A), other 
studies confute this statement and cite that no significant gains could be observed due 
to the “overinvestment problem” (shareholders are worried about extreme investment 
in low investment opportunities) (Gross & Lindstädt, 2005-2006). Due to the 
implementation of technological advantages resulting from the M&A and the reduction 
of agency and production costs, it is believed that bidder’s performance could be 
improved.  
What is more, previous studies (Markides & Oyon, 1998) proved that “international 
acquisition” is perceived as a profitable investment by the market through which the 
company can build a competitive advantage and can lead to the increase of bidder’s 
value in the contrast of “domestic acquisitions that are perceived as “liability” by 
investors” (Gross & Lindstädt, 2005-2006, p. 24). 
However, in general, the average return due to a successful acquisition is null for the 
acquiring company’s shareholders while the target company usually earns 
approximately 30% as return (Capron & Pistre, 2002). Similarly, Berg and De Marzo 
(Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011) state that target’s stock price usually presents an 
increase of 15% due to the merger announcement in comparison to the acquirer’s price 
that usually falls. According to Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips, both bidder and target 
companies, but mostly target ones, perform positive excess stock returns (Fresard, 
Hoberg, & Phillips, 2013). 
Another study, (Kedia, Ravid, & Pons, 2008), found that horizontal mergers resulted to 
significantly higher returns and that these returns were time varying, while on the other 
hand, vertical M&As were associated with positive abnormal returns until 1996 and they 
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fall significantly afterwards. They also point out the capture of the gains by the target 
firms rather than by the bidder ones. Moreover, according to the study of (Ellis, 2014), 
who investigated the abnormal returns of combined firms, it was found that horizontal 
mergers reported significant returns of 6.9% and vertical mergers 5.3% as well. We 
therefore expect to find positive abnormal returns mainly in the case of horizontal M&A 
types and less positive in the vertical ones. 
Gross’s and Lindstandt’s study (2005-2006) which refers in the existence of abnormal 
returns in mergers and disintegrations in several industries, proved that cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAAR) exist in both horizontal and vertical mergers in automotive 
sector. The study shows that cumulative abnormal returns in horizontal mergers -
especially in international level- are positive (+2%) for the bidding firms, while in vertical 
integration cumulative abnormal returns perform negative figures (-3.1%). According to 
the authors possible reason why this happens is the audience belief that such 
transactions satisfy companies’ orientation to economies of scale and increase of sales. 
It is also impressive in the same study that the targets in automotive sector present the 
highest cumulative abnormal returns (27.5%) among the other sectors as well as a 
substantial (6.3%) increase in abnormal returns due to disintegrations of non-major 
sectors of the company (vertical disintegrations). 
Furthermore, the existence and degree of distribution of abnormal returns between the 
bidder and target is associated by with whom resources the value is created. Laurence 
Capron and Natalie Pistre’s study (2002) proved that in a horizontal acquisition, acquirer 
is appeared to have abnormal returns when value creation comes from its own 
resources while when the resources are offered by the target the benefits of returns is 
accrued by the target (Capron & Pistre, 2002). This is explained in Laurence Capron and 
Natalie Pistre’s academic paper because of the fact that high competition is developed 
between the possible bidders which in turn increases the deal’s premium until the “Net 
Present Value (NPV) for the successful bidder is close to zero” (Capron & Pistre, 2002). 
The achievement of operating efficiency through a takeover is very crucial aspect for the 
companies merged. As presented in Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford’s  paper (2001), the 
analysis of Healy, Palepu, & Ruback (1992) proves that the merged companies gain a 
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competitive advantage in operating performance in comparison with their competitors 
in the sector, not only before but also after the transaction (James, 2005). They 
discovered that the merged companies present extremely “higher operating cash flows 
relative to their industry peers” prior to the takeover (James, 2005). The operating cash 
flow returns are reduced after M&As but they still remain higher than their competitors’. 
However, there are also other studies such as Ravenscraft and Scherer’s study that 
found out targets’ profitability loss after the merger (Ravenscraft, David, & Scherer, 
1989). 
In addition, it is important to note that merger activities strongly clusters by industry 
(Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001), which means that it is necessary to investigate 
M&A performance in each industry separately, since their unique indicators and factors 
provide different evidence. For this reason, we chose to focus our study about M&A 
performance only in the automotive industry, in order to provide more targeted results. 
Based on the previous research, we also expect to find excess stock returns for the target 
companies, while for the acquiring ones, the abnormal returns are likely to be close to 
zero.  
Moreover, as already mentioned, our study also tends to provide comparison between 
different M&A types, horizontal and vertical. Based on Wansley, Lane, & Yang’s study, 
which referred only to acquiring firms, both horizontal and vertical types showed larger 
cumulative abnormal returns than in conglomerate type (Wansley, Lane, & Yang, 2019). 
We anticipate that we will find relation between the market reaction and the M&A type 
of the transactions conducted among automotive companies. 
2.2 Horizontal M&As 
It is well known that horizontal mergers and acquisitions are a strategic action for a 
company to enforce its presence in the market by increasing its profitability and 
reducing its costs. Horizontal M&A is defined as the expansion of a firm by acquiring 
companies which run business in the same sector which means that the acquirer has 
substantial knowledge and experience of the industry. The latter facilitates the 
integration stage and increases the possibility of a successful M&A. Based on Ziva (2017) 
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and Gross & Lindstädt (2005-2006) there are several reasons why horizontal M&As raise 
more expectations of enhancing profitability: 
1) The competition is reduced in the industry as less companies operate (market 
power hypothesis). As a result, the firm can increase its market share and have 
better control over pricing (it can raise the prices -if possible- in order to increase 
profits). Furthermore, if it is expanded geographically, the company can also take 
advantage of diversification. Based on diversification hypothesis a merged firm 
can exploit geographical expansion and larger variety of products offering, 
reducing in this way total risk. 
2) Because of companies’ operational similarities, management can adjust quickly 
to the new situation, achieve integration and tackle more efficiently potential 
problems thus minimizing the risk factors and cash-flow variations 
3) The company benefits from economies of scale and scope, take advantage of the 
elimination of the equipment duplication and make excess workforce redundant, 
thus reducing its costs.  
2.2.1 Negative consequences and anti-trust regime 
Possible adverse consequences of horizontal mergers in the market may be the creation 
of a monopolistic/ oligopolistic environment that can result in rising prices for the 
customers as well as lower suppliers’ profits (Bhattacharyya & Amrita, 2009). Oligopolies 
and monopolies are two kinds of markets that are characterized by the price-fixing 
phenomenon which means that the market power of these companies is high, and they 
tend to impose prices usually higher than competitive markets do. High concentration 
levels and collusion can also lead to lower levels of production in order these companies 
to earn excess returns. Suppliers are also influenced by a horizontal merger as the 
companies merged can exert buying power demanding for example discounts or more 
beneficiary credit limits. The intensity that the suppliers are affected correlates to their 
dependence on the firms merged. In the case where the firm collaborates with specific 
suppliers, it is noticed that the input prices may rise (Lommerud, Odd Rune , & Lars , 
2001). 
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The state, in order to prevent horizontal mergers from exerting monopoly power in the 
market evaluate and compare the “initial level of concentration” in the sector with the 
predicted one after the completion of M&A (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001) 
(Farrell & Shapiro, 1990). Both in the US and EU there is antitrust legislation that ensure 
that “healthy” competition exists and that there are not made practices that distort 
trade. For this reason, economic models are used by regulators so as to predict possible 
“anticompetitive effects” of an M&A (Hay & Werden, 1993). Although horizontal 
mergers are more likely to lead to monopoly/oligopoly -in comparison with vertical and 
conglomerate mergers- because they result in the reduction of the number of the 
independent players in the same sector- horizontal mergers can be proved efficiency 
boosters especially in cases when competitor’s company underperform due to 
management incapability. 
2.2.2 Horizontal M&As substitute 
An alternative way for the achievement of horizontal mergers’ benefits is through 
alliances which are considered as horizontal mergers substitutes. Both strategies aim to 
the exploitation of new resources, cost and risk reduction, expansion to new markets 
but a merger focus more on the control over the other entity while an alliance offers 
flexibility and independency thus not constituting a permanent situation. James Sawler 
proved that alliances are more profitable than horizontal mergers because both the 
costs can be restricted and the market share increase of non-merging competitors is 
avoided (“horizontal mergers paradox”) (James, 2005). The latter is provoked because a 
merger can lead to monopoly gains not only for the companies paid the costs related to 
the merger but also to unrelated competitive parties in the industry (Berk & Peter, 
2017). 
2.3 Vertical M&As 
The type of vertical M&As is a combination of two or more companies included into the 
same industry but operate in different levels in the supply chain of a product or service. 
It can be classified into backward integration and forward integration. Backward 
integration refers to merging with suppliers and producers whereas forward integration 
refers to merging with distributors and retailers. According to Stuckey & White (1993), 
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vertical integration is simply a way of coordinating the different stages of an industry 
chain when bilateral trading is not beneficial. Researchers also relate vertical integration 
with the control of the whole industry chain of their production, from the initial input 
from suppliers to the distribution of the output to the final consumer (Zhang, 2013). Due 
to the particularity of the vertical type of M&As, we need to elaborate deeper in its 
perspectives and key elements.     
In general, the rational and the effectiveness of vertical integration strategy depend on 
the industry. As it is stated, vertical integration is industry-specific (Zhang, 2013) and it 
is heterogeneous across sectors (Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips, 2013). For example, Health, 
Drugs, and Telecommunication industry exhibit a low degree of vertical integration. 
These sectors perform very high R&D costs and they are more likely to avoid integration 
due to the need to ex-ante incentivize investment in relationship with specific 
investment. On the other hand, Steel, Aerospace, Automotive or Electrical Equipment 
Sectors appear to be essentially vertical integrated (Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips, 2013). 
Matsushima & Mizuno (2009)  also mention that vertical integration has become a 
widespread phenomenon in the industrialized world, while  Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips 
argue that the average firm is less vertically integrated in recent years than in the late 
1990s (Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips, 2013). 
Moreover, past research shows that vertical mergers take place among firms which are 
more capital intensive and actually perform lower M/B ratio (Market to Book Value, 
higher PP&E/assets (Property, Plant & Equipment ratio) and lower product market 
liquidity. It is also noted that in the early phases of development firms avoid vertical 
mergers. However, in a later decision making process, vertical integration seems to be a 
useful tool for growth opportunities, always in conjunction with stable and mature 
markets (Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips, 2013). 
2.3.1 The rationale behind vertical M&As 
Companies believe that vertical M&As create value for the merged business that is 
worth more than the separate businesses under individual ownership. Vertical 
integration provides a strategic tool for companies to grow their businesses and acquire 
more control over the steps supporting the supply chain. 
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Contrary to horizontal mergers, where rivals who operate in the same stage of the 
supply chain merge to lessen competition in the market, vertical mergers allow 
companies to grow their operations into different phases of the supply chain. They 
actually allow companies to use the synergies which result in efficient operation, cost 
reduction and business expansion.  
Empirical evidence suggests that firms appreciate that companies in adjacent stages of 
their supply chain have more market power (Stuckey & White, 1993). However, when 
companies in the weak stages of the supply chain merge vertically with those of the 
more powerful ones, they end up paying high premiums. This case eventually turns to 
be injurious, as the value of the benefits achieved is lower than the premium of the 
whole deal. 
The benefits of vertical M&As are many, as they are related with operating, financial and 
managerial synergies. Vertical integration provides better management of information 
flow between stages of production, resulting in the reduction of the transaction costs 
(Zhang, 2013). Zhang also mentions that factors such as competition, market structure, 
technological and demand uncertainty and more importantly cost-efficiency are factors 
that determine the management’s decision between vertical integration and buying 
from independent suppliers (Zhang, 2013). Furthermore, vertical integration can result 
in a better-quality product sold at a lower price (Lin, Parlaktürk, & Swaminathan, 2014). 
2.3.2 Related key indicators of vertical M&As 
Previous studies consider vertical M&As to be related with essential market and product 
key indicators, which independently or in combination with others affect managerial 
decision for vertical integration. 
Many argue that the decision between vertical integration and external supply is driven 
primarily by cost-efficiency (Zhang, 2013).  Management should examine and compare 
the production cost versus the cost of the input from an independent party. Vertical 
integration level should increase when internal supply is less costly, while on the other 
hand, vertical integration should be avoided in the cases of lower transaction costs with 
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external suppliers. Market-based transactions are more beneficial when the market 
experiences new technologies and new transportation channels (Zhang, 2013). 
Furthermore, innovation appears to be an important determinant when it comes to 
vertical M&As (Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips, 2013). Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips (2013) 
distinguish unrealized innovation through R&D and realized innovation through patents 
in order to show the possibility of vertical integration. They found that in industries with 
significant R&D activity, firms are more likely to avoid vertical integration and sustain 
arms-length customer-supplier relationships along with strong incentives for 
investments in high technology. Mergers can threaten relationship specific investments 
when firms have explicitly identified customer - supplier links.  
On the contrary, realized innovation is present in markets with high patenting rates 
where firms are more likely to vertically integrate in order to achieve synergies and avoid 
ex-post holdup. Following innovation success, firms can take advantage of vertical 
integration in order to commercialize their patents using the property rights of already 
realized innovation.  
Patents play an even important role when they are related with market stability. Market 
maturity and product stability tend to encourage vertical integration, especially when 
firms operate in a stable market for a long time and they are able to recover any 
additional fixed costs in the integration transaction (Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips, 2013) 
Another key indicator for vertical integration is the asset specificity in conjunction with 
the frequency of the transactions between buyers and sellers. This combination refers 
to the relationship between the close proximity of the assets of the two parties and the 
frequency of their interaction. When both asset specificity and transaction frequency is 
high then vertical integration is preferable for the parties engaged in order to minimize 
transport and inventory costs (Stuckey & White, 1993).  
The most common and important feature related to vertical integration is the supply 
chain. The role of supply chain absolutely affects the decision to engage in vertical 
M&As. Based on Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips (2013), in the presence of a stable supply 
chain, firms are more likely to vertically integrate as it may result in a high level of 
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economic benefits, while unstable supply chains may increase fixed costs due to the 
need of reorganization.   
Other studies have also indicated that the vertical integration depends on the demand 
and supply uncertainty (Kouvelis & Milner, 2002). According to Kouvelis & Milner  
(2002), these two market factors have a reverse effect upon the decision making 
regarding vertical integration against outsourcing. Greater supply uncertainty 
encourages vertical integration, while greater demand uncertainty increases the 
reliance on external resources. In addition, the stage of the life cycle of the product or 
service also plays a significant role. For example, companies with mature products with 
little demand are not likely to vertically integrate, unless they enter in new markets 
(Kouvelis & Milner, 2002). 
2.3.3 Forward and backward integration 
The vertical type of M&As is categorized into backward and forward, where backward 
refers to the integration into the supply of resources and forward refers to the 
integration into the distribution and sales (Zhang, 2013). They are both major concerns 
when future plans are developed for an organization. With backward integration 
companies try to control over their supply chains and try to obtain raw materials 
directly, eliminating the suppliers. It can be beneficial for the company as it gets the raw 
materials at reduced costs. As a result, company’s sales can be enhanced, and its bottom 
line gets healthier. Ultimately, companies can get a better control over their business 
operations. Reduced dependency on suppliers also ensures the availability of raw 
materials on time. 
Businesses choose forward integration when they decide to execute distribution or 
retail functions within the distribution channel. In such a situation, manufacturers may 
eliminate the wholesalers to sell directly to retailers or eliminate the retailers to sell 
directly to customers. The concept behind this strategy is to reduce the cost and increase 
the efficiency of the firm by getting closer to the end customer.  
Supporters of forward integration suggest that forward integration is based on the 
correlation between proximity to final consumers and corporate profitability. Some 
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researchers believe that this correlation is rather weak and immaterial (Stuckey & 
White, 1993). However, Stuckey & White (1993) also state that this strategy can benefit 
companies achieving price discrimination. Implementing forward integration with low-
price distributors, companies avoid reselling of their product from the low-price 
segment to the high-price segment, enjoying maximum profits (Stuckey & White, 1993). 
Furthermore, there is the view that forward integration is beneficial to the development 
of young markets (Lin, Parlaktürk, & Swaminathan, 2014). 
2.3.4  Risks and drawbacks of vertical M&As 
Vertical integration may be a highly efficient strategy for the company’s development, 
but it is very difficult to implement successfully. There are many cases where a vertical 
merger is not only inadequate, but also inappropriate to use as strategic tool and 
corporate management’s decisions turned to be unsuccessful and costly to fix. Vertical 
integration helps companies to reduce risks but it requires heavy setup costs, and its 
implementation is doubtfully efficient (Stuckey & White, 1993).  
Furthermore, Stuckey & White determine the market structure as essential feature to 
vertical integrations (Stuckey & White, 1993). Based on their research, when there are 
few buyers and sellers in the market, each of them tries to leverage its monopoly status, 
which in turn can lead to haggling and exploitation. In Figure 1 you may see the different 
market structure in relation to the balance of the power between buyers and sellers. As 
all parties try to gain their slice of the pie, bilateral oligopolies have to deal with complex 
coordination problems.  
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Figure 1 Vertical market structures (Source: Stuckey & White, 1993) 
 
 
Despite the benefits a vertical integration may offer, there are also issues that may arise. 
Following a vertical merger, firms are likely to experience negatively correlated 
movements in accounts payable and accounts receivables, caused by the lack of 
adjacency in the supply chain (Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips, 2013). Having said that, the 
stability of the supply chain remains a unique and essential determinant in the M&As 
decision making process, in order for firms to enjoy long-term gains from operational 
synergies. 
2.3.5 Controversy in vertical M&As 
Vertical mergers, like other business transactions, come with the controversial aspect as 
well. To start with, anti-trust violation laws often come into play when such a merger is 
more likely to reduce the competition in the market. It can also be used by companies 
to block access to raw materials for other players in the supply chain and hence 
destroying the fair competition through unfair business practices. It also could be used 
by companies to collude to gain economic advantage in the supply chain. 
Competition is healthy for consumers as it allows the companies to brainstorm and 
provide innovative high-quality products and services to the end user. Though using 
vertical integration to gain the edge over the competitors is not illegal but using it to 
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control the market by shady business practices like controlling the flow of raw material 
etc. may come under the purview of law and is subjected to scrutiny in many countries.  
Having presented many aspects and perspectives of vertical M&As, we may easily 
understand that besides the benefits of this managerial strategy, companies can gain 
power by raising barriers to entry and control the market, achieving price discrimination. 
Especially, when the industry experiences downturn, weaker players cease to exist and 
the rest are left vulnerable to the exploitation by the increasingly concentrated suppliers 
or customers (Stuckey & White, 1993). 
To sum up, vertical M&As may create several issues and the consequences can be 
depicted in the insufficient supply chain processes. As Raisch (2004) refers to the study 
of D’Aveni and Ilinitch, 1992, vertical integration may cause problems in control and 
coordination, as well as in the managerial activities. Furthermore, it creates market 
issues and may “urge companies to forgo purchasing at low prices in the open market” 
(D’Aveni and Ilinitch, 1992). 
2.4 Automotive industry 
The usefulness of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as a corporate tool to pursue 
strategic growth is the reason for the increasing number of the transactions within the 
automotive industry. In this section, we provide an analysis of the importance, the 
reasons and trends of M&As in the automotive sector and we give an emphasis on the 
horizontal and vertical M&As in the industry examined. 
2.4.1 Introduction of M&As in automotive industry 
The automotive sector is one of the most well-known sectors that M&As take place. 
High competition levels as well as rapid technological improvements force companies to 
be consolidated in order to remain competitive and cope with the rising costs of raw 
materials. Consolidation facilitates companies to take advantage of economies of scale 
and open up new markets as well as restrict the high expenditures on research and 
development. The main motivations behind automotive M&As, according to (Warter & 
Warter, 2016) are economies of scale, geographic market expansion, risk reduction and 
diversification, leveraging of core competencies and technological changes. According 
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to Warter & Warter’s study, Trompenaars and Asser (2010) also observe that mergers, 
acquisitions and strategic alliances keep being an effective way for global business 
expansion. Even during economic crisis, where the banking difficulties and credit 
restrictions become more severe, the automotive industry is not likely to shrink (Warter 
& Warter, 2016). 
Automotive industry is a highly capital-intensive industry and in conjunction with cyclical 
characteristics, the larger the company becomes, the less affected from sale volatility is 
(Financial Times, March 2019). As a result, executives anticipate that the area of M&As 
in this field will continue to prosper in the upcoming years both with domestic and cross-
sector deals.  Based on PWC report  this increasing trend of mergers in this field will 
continue to grow and expects to reach $44 billion in transactions in 2019 noting that 
remarkable trends in this field are connected cars, autonomous vehicles, ride sharing 
and, of course, electrification (PWC, December 2019).  
As far as automobile industry in general, KPMG report  anticipates that “by 2030 less 
than 5% of cars will be produced in Western Europe” and that “industry policies in Asia 
& USA seem to be far more advanced than in Europe” (KPMG, 2019). What is more, 
digitization will play a key role and automotive companies are expected to cooperate 
much with tech companies. Several types of fuels and combustion will be used but few 
investments in fuel cells will be made as well as the main reason preventing the 
consumers from buying electric cars, will be the price. Customer high demand is 
expected for services such as “navigation systems, adaptive cruise control & power 
upgrade”. Finally, KPMG report states that the profitability of automobile company is 
unlikely to decrease. 
As one of the world’s largest manufacturing industries, the automotive industry has the 
capability to influence the labor, trade and capital markets and also governments’ 
macroeconomic and industrial aims (Warter & Warter, 2016). However, critical issues of 
consolidations in automotive sector could arise. The most common is the degree of 
cultural integration between companies which is a common problem in M&A field. 
Cultural integration may never be succeeded like in Daimler-Chrysler case or can be 
partially achieved (Renault-Nissan alliance).  
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What is more, because of the fact that automotive sector is an industry highly politically 
affected  ̶ for example in some countries there are state shareholder  ̶  this usually 
influence the decisions of the companies on making a deal or not. For this reason, both 
cross-sectional deals become more complicated and time-consuming and the possible 
negative outcomes of a merger (i.e. job redundancies) may terminate the consolidation 
process. Another critical factor in the automotive integration may be the barriers 
created in the case of cross-border M&A, such as local regulations and industry 
standards, language and local culture etc. (Warter & Warter, 2016). Automotive 
companies need to overcome these barriers in order to expand internationally access 
new customers in new markets or acquire new production capabilities or technology. 
Historically, we notice that in the automotive industry M&As have not always been 
successful. Two unsuccessful popular examples are the acquisition of Rover by BMW, in 
2000, and the divestment of Chrysler by Daimler-Benz in 2007. On the other hand, the 
alliance between Renault and Nissan and the acquisition of Skoda and Seat by 
Volkswagen have proved to be successful. Researchers have not yet been able to 
determine the key factors behind an M&A success or failure, since the findings on the 
general performance of M&As are inconsistent and contradictory (Warter & Warter, 
2016). According to the Warter & Warter’s study, realization of the integration benefits 
and the creation of the wealth is not a straightforward procedure, and the evaluation of 
their effectiveness is measured through different metrics. Most surveys and metrics, 
until 2016, resulted to a success rate of about one third, while some have found that 
only 20% of mergers and acquisitions are ultimately successful (Warter & Warter, 2016). 
2.4.2 Horizontal and vertical M&As in automotive industry 
M&A seems to be an important way for automotive companies to boost sales not only 
locally but also worldwide and become competitive taking advantage of economies of 
scale. A usual reason for consolidation could be the exploitation of advances in 
technology and like the development of self-driven cars and “electric vehicle 
technology” (Financial Times, March 2019) which is a major trend of the century. In 
addition, competition among automotive companies has exacerbated during last 
decades which can be easily depicted on the sales slowdown and on the market share 
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restriction of the key market players (Bloomberg, April 2019) making the consolidation 
prospect luring enough especially because of the using of “pooling resources” and 
therefore reduction of costs. Horizontal M&As is a very popular strategic decision, in 
order for automotive companies to dominate in the market competition. 
On the other hand, the presence of vertical M&As is also very intense in the automotive 
industry, as it allows companies to develop their production line and maintain their 
piece of pie in the international and domestic market. In automobile product 
development, the degree of vertical integration for a single manufacturer is the 
consequence of hundreds of individual procurement choices, ranging from simple 
supply contracts for commodity components to complex arrangements for cutting-edge 
technology development (Matsushima & Mizuno, 2009).  
It is important to mention here that, although vertical integration can offer significant 
benefits to the engaged parties, different cultures provide different aspects on this 
matter. More indicatevely, Matsushima & Mizuno (2009) elaborate their study on the 
comparison of vertical M&As in the automotive sector between USA and Japan, to point 
out the difference of their cultures and their markets regarding vertical integration. They 
argue that the presence of vertical mergers was more evident in the USA rather than in 
Japan, due to many reasons. Firms in the USA were urged to vertically integrate in order 
to avoid negative interactions with their trading partners, while japanese firms tended 
to give much value on their partnerships, regardless of their dependency negative 
effects. Another reason for the little presence of vertical M&As in Japan were the 
limitations of its financial markets. 
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3 Data 
To begin with, our sample was downloaded from Thomson One Database. We separated 
our analysis into two main parts. The first part concerned the horizontal mergers in 
automotive sector and the second included the vertical ones. 
In order to determine whether a merger was horizontal or vertical, we first examined all 
the deals in automotive since 2000. Our intention was to examine every deal conducted 
between automotive companies and comprehend the possible targets or bidders 
engaged. For this reason, we downloaded the sample from Thomson One Database 
without setting any criteria, except our main SIC code, 3711 – motor vehicles and 
passenger car bodies. Any deal which included SIC code 3711 was in our first sample of 
1652 results. We then categorized the parties engaged into 4 categories1– horizontal, 
vertical, conglomerate and investors. Finally, we excluded the categories of 
conglomerate and investors from our analysis, so as to focus our research to the two 
main types of M&As, horizontal and vertical, and compare the results.  
The buybacks transactions, 83 in number, were removed from the population, as they 
are not considered as horizontal or vertical Μ&Αs. Buybacks are actually a different kind 
of transaction where the company buys its own outstanding shares to reduce the 
number of shares available and return money to the company’s shareholders. This 
procedure usually affects the stock price upwards.   
After categorizing the SIC codes, we then removed all deals which did not meet our 
criteria. Our criteria for the population chosen were the following: 
• All deals were announced during the period 2008 - 2018. The reason for our choice 
not to include deals before 2008 was mainly due to the fact that before financial crisis 
the market reacted differently. Financial crisis of 2008 has affected all economies and 
consequently the shareholders’ behavior. In order to capture the actual sensitivity of 
abnormal return we had to avoid including data which reflected different market 
conditions. 
 
1 The categories of SIC codes excluded or included in the population is presented in Table A 1 in the 
Appendix. 
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• All bidders were exclusively manufacturers of motor vehicles and passenger car 
bodies or truck and bus bodies. So, the SIC codes of bidders were limited to two, 3711 
and 3713. All other SIC codes from automotive industry were defined as companies 
which products or services belonged to different stages in the supply chain2.  
Finally, additionally to these criteria we restricted our sample and focused on the 
companies which have a public status in order to make an event study analysis and 
estimate the abnormal returns.  
3.1 Analysis of the population 
As a result, the number of deals consisted our population for all automotive horizontal 
and vertical M&As during the decade 2008-2018 is showed in the Table 1. 
Table 1. Population of total horizontal and vertical M&As during 2008 – 2018 
M&A TOTAL M&As M&A TYPE % COMPLETED COMPLETED %  
HORIZONTAL 534 42,15% 324 60,67% 
VERTICAL 733 57,85% 505 68,89% 
TOTAL M&As 1267 100,00% 829 65,43% 
 
The horizontal M&As, for which we set both bidders and targets with the SIC code 3711 
and 3713, included 534 deals, reaching the proportion of 42,15% of total number, 
against the vertical proportion of 57,85%. This distribution of the M&A types came in 
contrast with previous studies. More indicatively, Gross & Lindstädt (2005-2006) found 
that in overall market, horizontal deals outweigh the vertical ones. It seems that vertical 
M&As as a strategic tool in automotive industry has drawn much attention in the resent 
years.  
On the other hand, for vertical M&As, we had to exclude SIC codes 3711 or 3713 as 
targets, as well as conglomerate deals or deals with investor institutions. The final 
population of vertical M&As consisted of 733 deals, of which 505 were actually 
 
2 All SIC Codes included in the vertical M&A type and defined as forward and backward are presented in 
Table A 2 and Table A 3 in the Appendix. 
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completed later, reaching the proportion of 68,89% of total vertical deals, while the 
horizontal M&As that achieved to complete were in total 324, that is 60,67%. 
In the following part of the chapter, we make a statistical analysis of total horizontal and 
vertical M&As in automotive sector, that were announced during the period 2008-2018. 
Our intention to separate the sample into horizontal and vertical remains, so that we 
have clear insight of total M&As in automotive sector in general and for each type 
separately regarding their frequency, the nation of the corporations, the completion of 
the deals etc. 
3.1.1 Number of M&As per type 
In Figure 2 you may see the number of horizontal and vertical deals on a yearly basis, 
during 2008-20183. What is interesting is the fact that horizontal deals were in full swing 
during the years 2008-2012, recording the highest number in 2009, 76 out of 534 
horizontal M&As, 14,23% of total population in the decade.  
Figure 2. Number of M&As per type during 2008-2018 
 
Indicatively, only during the four-year period 2008-2012, Volkswagen AG announced 11 
horizontal deals, Fiat SpA announced 6 and Navistar International Corp announced 5. All 
deals mentioned were actually completed later. On the contrary, the following years, 
fewer horizontal deals were announced with the lower number to be depicted in 2015, 
31 out of 534 horizontal M&As, 5,81% of total population in the decade. 
 
3 Table A 4 in Appendix presents the frequency of the M&A deals in more detail for each year. 
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On the other hand, vertical mergers did not show the same flow.  Most deals were 
announced last year, 2018, 91 out of 733 vertical M&As (12,41%), and also 10 years 
back, in 2008, 85 out of 733 vertical M&As (11,6%). Indicatively, in 2018 Lippert 
Components Inc, Toyota Motor Corp and Volkswagen AG announced 3 vertical deals 
each, all of which were completed later. The number of vertical M&As, between the 
period 2008-2018, were declining until the large drop in 2012, only 42 of 733 vertical 
M&As (5,73%), to start increasing again until the highest level in 2018. Finally, it should 
be noted that between 2012 and 2014, fewer deals were announced compared to 
previous years, both for horizontal and vertical type.  
3.1.2 Proportion of shares acquired per type 
When a bidder purchases most or all of another company's shares, it gains control of 
the entire target company. The purchase of portion of more than 50% of a target firm's 
stock allows the acquirer to make decisions about the newly acquired assets without the 
approval of the company’s shareholders. 
In the following pie Figure 3, you may see the proportion of total shares acquired in the 
transaction both for horizontal and vertical types again. Apparently, only for the 
completed deals we were provided with data regarding the proportion of the number 
of shares outstanding, so this Figure 3 refers only to the completed M&As in the 
automotive industry, which were announced during 2008-2018. 
Figure 3. Proportion of shares acquired per M&A type 
 
It is clear for both M&A types in automotive sector that in over than 60% of the 
transactions, bidders acquired more than 50% of targets’ shares. Both cases had very 
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similar results regarding this matter, as 69% of horizontal transactions and 72% of 
vertical transactions were related to acquisitions of more than half of the target 
company. Therefore, in both horizontal and vertical mergers, around 30% of bidders 
purchased less than 50% of targets’ shares, enjoying only a smaller non-controlling 
ownership interest. In case where the stake is less than 50%, the firm is considered 
an associate or affiliate company. 
The ownership of 50% or more of voting stock creates a subsidiary. The financial 
statements of the parent and subsidiary are consolidated to reflect the control 
relationship between them, contrary to the affiliate or associate where financial 
reporting is presented differently. In case of 100% acquisition, the target becomes a 
wholly owned subsidiary.  
Figure 4 presents the percentage of deals in automotive industry, where the bidder 
purchased the total number of shares of the target company. It is very clear from the 
graph that for both M&A types, more than half of all completed deals turned to the total 
control of the target by the bidder company. More specifically, vertical mergers where 
acquisition created a wholly owned subsidiary consisted the 57,14% of total population 
for the decade 2008-2018, and horizontal mergers recorded a very similar level of 
53,59%.   
Figure 4. M&As which created a wholly owned subsidiary per type 
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Indicatively, Volkswagen AG, during the period 2008-2018, acquired 100% shares of 7 
companies, three of them competitive corporations, AFL Europe GmbH , OOO 
Volkswagen Rus, Wilhelm Karmann GmbH, and four of them operating on adjacent 
stages of the supply chain, Kroymans Auto dealers-Berlin, MAHAG Automobilhandel & 
Svc, Man Energy Solutions Se, Porsche Holding GmbH. Volkswagen AG is one of the 
largest automotive manufacturers in the world and its Group comprises of twelve 
brands from seven European countries. Automotive companies implement both vertical 
and horizontal strategies, in order to develop and improve their operations and their 
profits.  
3.1.3 Domestic vs cross-border M&As per type 
Nation distribution is important to be analyzed as it helps us comprehend the 
geographical area towards which the automotive companies tend to direct their 
development plans. First, we should distinguish the M&A transactions between bidders 
and targets which operated in the same geographical region. According to the below 
Figure 5, automotive companies, during the decade 2008-2018 tended to merge with 
domestic companies, in both horizontal and vertical cases. The proportion of vertical 
domestic M&As was almost 70%, against the cross-border vertical mergers. Likewise, 
the related percentage for horizontal M&A was 61,42%. We may therefore conclude 
that management of automotive companies directed their development and merging 
plans mainly towards the same geographical region, in order to gain control of the 
existing market they already operate.  
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Figure 5. Cross-border vs Domestic M&As per type 
 
Following the second question, regarding the nation of the automotive population, we 
may see the Figure 6 and Figure 7, where the nations of most acquirers and targets 
during 2008-2018, are presented respectively. For each M&A type, we only chose the 
first five nations with the highest presence of acquirers and targets.  
Figure 6. Acquiror nation per M&A type 
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As we may see, in both Figure 5 and Figure 6, for both M&A types, the companies were 
located approximately within the same countries. It is very clear from Figure 6, that 
China, with the proportion of 30,90% for horizontal population and 23,33% for vertical 
population, was the dominated country with regards to the geographical location of the 
acquiring companies engaged in M&A deals, independent of the M&A type and the 
transaction party. For the acquiror party, USA, German and Japan came next.  USA 
seemed to be the location of 17,33% of total acquirers merged horizontally against 
10,33% of acquirers which merged vertically. The bidders located in Germany showed 
similar results when we examined the M&A type, with proportion of 10%, as per both 
types. 
Figure 7. Target nation per M&A type 
  
If we take into account the Figure 5 and Figure 7, we may easily conclude that the 
prevailed countries where target companies were located were very similar to the 
acquirers location, China once again reported very high percentage of 27,15% for 
horizontal and 22,78% for vertical. USA, Germany and Russian Federation were 
following. More detailed information regarding the nation of the acquirors and targets 
in horizontal and vertical M&As during 2008-2018, are presented in Table A 5 and Table 
A 6, in the Appendix. 
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3.1.4 Backward vs forward vertical M&As 
As already discussed in previous chapter, vertical integration is distinguished between 
two main categories, forward and backward integration. The separation of these two 
types of vertical M&As is essential, as it shows the intention of management to approach 
suppliers or clients. In Figure 8, we present this management intention.  
Figure 8. Backward vs Forward vertical M&As. 
  
It is obvious from the Figure 8 that during the period 2008-2018, automotive companies 
merged vertically in order to gain control of their suppliers and develop their product’s 
supply chain. On the other hand, only 20% of automotive acquirers targeted companies 
from the next stages of the industry chain, the distributors. 
3.2 Abnormal returns sample 
As already mentioned, our sample included deals between years 2008 and 2018. The 
main purpose of our study’s analysis focused on the reaction of the market on the M&As 
announcement date. Consequently, we had to collect the companies’ share prices and 
analyze the abnormal returns of the companies engaged in each transaction. From total 
population only few companies were public with available share price data trading in a 
stock exchange for the needs of the event period analysis. In Table 2, we show the total 
sample used in our event period analysis in total and per M&A type. 
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Table 2. Number of public companies with available stock prices. 
COMPANIES ANALYZED HORIZONTAL VERTICAL TOTAL 
BIDDERS 54 45 99 
TARGETS 56 36 92 
TOTAL 110 81 191 
 
Stock prices of bidders, targets and indices were collected from Eikon Thomson 
Database. Another source used for the data collection was Yahoo finance. Public 
companies for which stock prices were not available, were eventually excluded from the 
sample. In addition, the M&A deals used for our analysis are presented in Table A 7 and 
Table A 8 in the Appendix. 
3.3 Profitability data of acquiring firms 
After the abnormal returns analysis, we focused on how the profitability ratios 
performance of the acquiring firms were affected following the completion of M&A. 
Analysis of the target’s performance was not included in our research due to the fact 
that many of the merged firms ceased to exist after the merger and post-merger group 
performance of the firms is not included in our study. Having said that, an accounting 
analysis conducted on automotive acquirors’ performance around the actual merger 
date. Actual merger dates, or in other words, closed dates of the M&As were found on 
Capital IQ database as well as in other sources such as Wikipedia, Bloomberg and 
Financial Times.  
Bidders’ performance was measured by using profitability ratios. Ratios of each 
company were downloaded from Thomson EIKON database. Both ratios were calculated 
taking the average of two years before M&A and two years after the M&A. Previous 
researchers argue that two years pre and post M&A data is a sufficient period (Altunbas 
& Marqués, 2008). They also note that a period longer than two years might be biased 
due to some other external economic factors.  
From the total number of acquirors, we excluded the bidders which conducted M&As 
from 2018 onwards, since their profitability ratios after 2 years would not be available. 
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Additionally, in the cases that a bidder made more than one deal during the same year 
we took the ratios only once, since we chose annual ratio data from the Thomson Eikon 
database. In this way, we avoided using double data that would bias the results. 
Eventually, our sample was reduced even more when for the remained companies, 
profitability ratios were not available in any database or the closing deal date was not 
found. As a result, our final sample was 34 acquiring companies for both vertical and 
horizontal M&As. 
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4 Methodology 
Our study applied event study methodology for the investigation of Average Abnormal 
Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns caused by M&A announcements in 
the automotive industry between 2008 and 2018. Additionally, paired t-test applied for 
investigating any profitability improvement of acquiring firms. 
4.1 Event study methodology on abnormal returns 
Our study’s purpose was to investigate the existence of abnormal returns due to the 
announcement of a M&A. In other words, we examined the impact of M&A 
announcement on enterprise value both for the targets and the bidders involved.   
Classical event study methodology (Brown & Warner, 1985) was employed using 
Microsoft Excel for the calculations of Abnormal Returns and t-statistic analysis. We 
estimated market reaction to the announcement of an M&A using two different 
approaches: Market Model and Market Adjusted model. 
Event study methodology is a reliable and useful method applied in economics in order 
to evaluate and measure the possible effect of an event on the financial markets and 
the company’s value (MacKinlay, 1997). This approach believes that stocks reflect 
investors’ expectations, so the occurrence of an important event (such as an M&A 
announcement) would change their future anticipations for the company. Short-term 
analysis is more scientific reliable than long-term analysis and it is a usual method used 
to evaluate market reaction to a takeover because based on the efficiency capital 
market hypothesis “stock prices quickly adjust following a merger announcement, 
incorporating any expected value changes” (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001). 
According to Halpern, the first announcement date of a merger is more appropriate 
event date (t=0) than the actual date of the event because “information leaks” and 
rumors influence the audience anticipation of the deal success and creates abnormal 
returns (Halpern, 1983).  
The steps we followed are described below: 
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1. Having collected the companies share prices, we then calculated the daily log 
returns of the firms and the corresponding daily log returns of their related 
indexes. We took the natural logarithm of data in order to calculate the return, 
as per the Equation 1. 
Equation 1. Returns 
Return = LN(Pt Pt⁄ ) 
2. Both Market Model and Market Adjusted Model in our analysis were employed 
with an event window of (-10,10).  
The calculation of abnormal returns in our research spans from -10 days to +10 
days around the announcement date (day 0). As the event window selected is (-
10,+10), we posed an estimation window of (-250,-11) days, based on the below 
Figure 9. 
Figure 9. Estimation and Event window 
 
Based on the returns of the estimation period we calculated using OLS regression 
intercept (a) and slope (b) of Expected Returns which are used in the estimation 
of Abnormal Returns. Over the period examined these parameters, a and b, 
remain constant in order to estimate Expected and then eventually Abnormal 
Returns.  
Expected Returns regression was based on the following Equation 2, where Eit 
stands for the expected return at time t. ai and bi are market model coefficients 
estimated during the chosen estimation window period. 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the reference 
market return at time t.  
Equation 2. Expected Returns 
Eit =  ai + bi ∗ Rm, t 
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Abnormal returns estimated using both methods, based on the Equation 3. 
Abnormal Returns in the Market Model is defined as the difference between the 
actual and the predicted return (Krivin, Patton, Rose, & Tabak, 2003). 
Equation 3. Abnormal returns in Market Model 
ARi, t =  Ri, t – (ai + bi ∗ Rm, t) = Ri, t −  Ei, t 
Rit is the actual return and Ei,t is the calculated expected return for the firm’s 
stock at time t.  
Abnormal Returns in Market Adjusted Model, Equation 4, is defined as the 
subtraction of the market return (Rm,t) from the company return (Ri,t). (Scholes & 
Joseph, 1977).  
Equation 4. Abnormal Returns in Market Adjusted Model 
ARi, t = Ri, t − Rm, t 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARi,t)  calculated for both Market model and 
Market-Adjusted model, based on Equation 5. 
Equation 5. Average Abnormal Returns 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 =  
1
𝑁
=  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Then, Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) were estimated during the 
event windows, in order to have a broad picture of the consequences of the M&A 
announcement. CAARs were estimated in the event windows (-10, -1), (+1, +10), 
(-5, -1), (+1, +5),  (-1, +1) and (-1, 0), based on the Equation 6,  where event 
window is (t1,t2). 
Equation 6. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARi) 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 = ∑ AARi, t
𝑡2
𝑡1
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3. Statistical significance was examined for both Average Abnormal Returns (AARi,t) 
and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs), using t-test analysis. The 
following Equation 7 and Equation 8 indicate the t-test formulas. 
Equation 7. T-test formula for Average Abnormal Returns 
𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) =
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑆(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡)
 
Equation 8. T-test formula for Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
 
𝑡(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) =
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑝, 𝑞)
𝑆(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) ∗ √(𝑞 − 𝑝)
 
4. Finally, based on the comparison of t-test figures and the related critical values, 
we concluded whether the null hypothesis is rejected or failed to be rejected. 
The null hypothesis examined whether the Average Abnormal Returns and the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns are equal to zero. 
Based on previous empirical research in a short-run period of time, M&A 
announcements influence investors’ expectations creating abnormal returns for the 
merged company after the consolidation (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Target firms  
create abnormal return gains while the results are more ambiguous for the bidders as 
some bidders “reap small positive abnormal returns whereas others suffer (small) 
losses” (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). 
Based on Martynova & Renneboog (2008) target shareholders benefit from statistically 
significant abnormal returns (ARs) around the first announcement date. The same study 
suggests that bidders’ abnormal returns are associated with the private or public status 
of the target and the payment method. For example, CARs are usually higher when a 
private company is acquired. What is more, bidders who conduct M&As in related 
sectors perform higher CARs than those who decide to make conglomerate mergers. All 
in all, bidders present insignificant CARs before the announcement. 
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4.2 Paired sample t-test on the post-M&A profitability of acquiring firms 
Following the average abnormal return analysis of the merged companies, which 
examined the wealth effect of the shareholders around the announcement of the event, 
a second analysis of post-merger performance was conducted. Despite the immediate 
impact of an event upon the stakeholders’ value, in the end, corporate management 
and investors are interested in the final benefits or drawbacks of an M&A in a short or a 
long term.  
Therefore, it is important to further investigate the value that is created after the event 
period. Previous studies on various samples suggested that M&As may have positive, 
neutral or negative impact on the performance of organizations (Otieno & Kemunto, 
2017). The research of Otieno & Kemunto (2017) refers to other studies, like Marangu 
(2007) and Girma, Wright, Conyon, & Thompson (2002) which found that M&As have 
positively affected the financial performance of the acquiring firms. On the other hand, 
another studies, by Akinbli and Kelilume (2013) and Abbas et al (2014) found that there 
was no significant effect of the M&As on the performance of the firms. Finally, as stated 
in Patel’s research (Patel, 2018) there are also some studies such as Pawaskar (2001) 
and Kumar and Bansal (2008) that conclude to the fact that there is a slight insignificant 
improvement in the performance ratios after the merger. Previous studies (Long, 2015) 
also report that in some researches (R. Correa,2008 and R. V. Vennet 2002) there is not 
clear evidence that there is performance amelioration and especially profitability 
increase after the completion of an M&A.  
More indicatively, this study uses the quantitative research design to measure the post-
merger performance of automotive sector companies using the return on equity (ROE) 
and the Net Profit Margin (NPM), which are described below in detail.  
• ROE is a measure of profitability and indicates how efficiently shareholders’ 
financing is handled for investments. Increasing ROE demonstrates a company’s 
ability to reinvest profits (Equation 9).  
Equation 9. ROE formula 
ROE =
Net Income 
Equity
 % 
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• Net Profit Margin measures the percentage of profits over the total revenues a 
company generates. This is one of the most important indicators of a company's 
financial health. A company can assess whether current practices are working 
and forecast profits based on revenues (Equation 10) 
Equation 10. Net Profit Margin formula 
Net Profit Margin =
Net Profit 
Total Revenue
% 
As already mentioned, bidders’ performance was measured by using profitability ratios. 
Ratios of each company were downloaded from Thomson EIKON database and both 
ratios were calculated taking the average of two years before M&A and two years after 
the M&A according to (Altunbas & Marqués, 2008), as depicted in Figure 3. A paired 
sample t-test was used to determine whether the selected financial performance 
indicators significantly improved following the M&A. Paired sample t-test analysis was 
employed in order to examine if the average mean difference between pre- and post- 
merger ratios were statistically different than zero.  As a result, we are going to have a 
clear view of whether the merger became beneficiary for the acquiror. This statistical 
procedure is usual in pre and post analysis of an event because it is utilized to compare 
two population means in the case of two samples that are associated (Sujud & Boutheina 
, 2018). 
Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis were developed, for which a 
synopsis is presented below. 
H0: M&As in automotive sector have not significantly impacted the profitability of 
acquiring firms. 
• ROE before M&A = ROE after M&A 
• NPM before M&A = NPM after M&A 
H1: M&As in automotive sector have significantly impacted the profitability of acquiring 
firms.  
• ROE before M&A ≠ ROE after M&A 
• NPM before M&A ≠ NPM after M&A 
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In chapter 5.3, a paired sample t-test analysis is presented using quantitative methods, 
where we finally conclude whether we failed to reject the null hypothesis or not. 
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5 Findings - data analysis 
In the following pages we report the results from the event period analysis of the 20 
days surrounding the announcement date of the M&A on bidders’ and targets’ returns. 
The analysis was conducted with both models, Market model and Market Adjusted 
Model. To indicate the statistical significance of the results we have bolded the figures 
in the tables and the level of significance is characterized from the number of asterisks 
next to the figures. More specifically, one asterisk refers to 10% of significance level, two 
asterisks refer to 5% and three asterisks refer to 1%.  
5.1 Average abnormal returns of bidders 
In this section, the results of the event study are provided for the bidders engaged in 
either horizontal or vertical M&As in automotive industry for the period 2008-2018. 
5.1.1 Bidders in horizontal M&As 
Starting with horizontal M&As, in Table 3, we notice statistically significant values in 
both pre- and post- event date. More indicatively, market adjusted model shows that 
AAR of -0,59% in day 0 was statistically significant at level 10%. Furthermore, with 
market model, we consider day 1 as statistically significant with value of -1,76%.  
Table 3. AARs of Bidders in horizontal M&As 
DATE 
ANNOUNCED 
MARKET MODEL MARKET ADJUSTED MODEL 
N=45 AAR % T-TEST AAR % T-TEST 
-10 -0,831*** -2,682 -0,936** -2,624 
-9 -0,055 -0,178 -0,105 -0,397 
-8 -0,348 -1,122 -0,430* -1,943 
-7 0,180 0,581 0,199 1,064 
-6 -0,044 -0,143 0,075 0,285 
-5 0,025 0,081 -0,021 -0,092 
-4 -0,191 -0,617 -0,325 -1,349 
-3 -0,085 -0,274 -0,129 -0,520 
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-2 0,504 1,627 0,323 1,029 
-1 -0,015 -0,049 -0,054 -0,149 
0 -0,504 -1,625 -0,585* -1,689 
1 -0,761** -2,455 -0,756 -1,386 
2 -0,053 -0,17 -0,051 -0,214 
3 0,158 0,510 0,019 0,081 
4 0,173 0,558 -0,020 -0,071 
5 -0,130 -0,420 -0,020 -0,067 
6 -0,115 -0,370 -0,231 -0,763 
7 0,097 0,314 0,0063 0,226 
8 -0,443 -1,430 -0,657** -2,086 
9 0,013 0,041 0,250 -0,833 
10 0,244 0,788 0,106 0,324 
 
More importantly, 10 days prior to the announcement date the value of AAR was 
statistically significant with both market model and market adjusted model, at level 1% 
and 5% respectively. On day -8, AARs report statistical significant figure of -0.43% at a 
significance level 10%, in the market adjusted model. We may therefore assume that 
shareholders had internal information and expected the event, but their reaction was 
rather negative. For the days following the announcement date, the results presented a 
statistically significant reaction in two days, +1 in the market model analysis and +8 in 
the market adjusted model analysis. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns represented a rather clear insight in the 
shareholders’ internal information and wealth effect. From Table 4, it is obvious that 
both pre- and post- event periods showed statistically significant results using both 
models. Overall, CAAR (-10, +10) was statistically significant with market adjusted 
model, at level 5%, with value of -3,79%. Prior to the event date, CAAR (-1, 0), CAAR (-1 
+1) showed statistical significance at level 1%, with both models, which definitely 
indicates the internal information of the upcoming news in the previous date of the 
announcement date.  
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Table 4. CAARs of bidders in horizontal M&As 
INTERVAL 
MARKET MODEL MARKET ADJUSTED MODEL 
CAAR  % T-TEST CAAR % T-TEST 
CAAR (-10 +10) -2,181 -1,536 -3,785** -2,629 
CAAR (-10 -1) -0,860 -0,878 -1,403 -1,412 
CAAR (+1 +10) -2,181** -2,226 -3,785*** -3,809 
CAAR (-5 +5) -1,977* -1,924 -2,816*** -2,702 
CAAR (-5 -1) -0,860 -1,242 -1,403* -1,997 
CAAR (+1 +5) -1,977*** -2,854 -2,816*** -4,007 
CAAR (-1 +1) -2,124*** -3,959 -2,744*** -5,042 
CAAR (-1 0) -1,364*** -3,113 -1,988*** -4,474 
 
Furthermore, for the post event days of the announcement, we also notice statistically 
significance in the event period (+1,+10) and (+1,+5), at level 5% and 1% respectively, 
using the market model, compared to very similar results with market adjusted model 
which showed statistical significance at level 1% for the same periods. All cumulative 
abnormal returns in Table 4, reflected the negative reaction of the market and therefore 
imply the negative wealth effect in the shareholders’ value. Horizontal M&As did not 
respond with positive signs in bidders’ share price. 
5.1.2 Bidders in vertical M&As 
Following the vertical M&As, we observe different results as per Table 5. First of all, we 
need to note that the results of two methods, Market Model and Market Adjusted 
Model were very similar. As we observe, AAR had both positive and negative values 
around day 0 using both methods, but none of them were statistically significant. 
However, it is important to mention that on the announcement date, AARs were positive 
by around 0,43%, one of the highest increases of the 20-day period.  
Table 5. AARs of Bidders in vertical M&As  
DATE 
ANNOUNCED 
MARKET MODEL MARKET ADJUSTED MODEL 
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N=54 AAR % T-TEST AAR % T-TEST 
-10 -0,470 -1,540 -0,403 -1,016 
-9 0,556* 1,824 0,552* 2,009 
-8 0,303 0,995 0,325 1,192 
-7 -0,010 -0,034 0,004 0,012 
-6 0,239 0,785 0,146 0,532 
-5 0,268 0,879 0,118 0,381 
-4 0,131 0,429 0,020 0,068 
-3 0,224 0,734 0,305 0,656 
-2 0,431 1,414 0,271 0,801 
-1 -0,408 -1,339 -0,523 -1,419 
0 0,426 1,397 0,418 1,575 
1 -0,296 -0,969 -0,415 -1,006 
2 0,221 0,726 0,175 0,680 
3 -0,191 -0,626 -0,305 -0,896 
4 -0,036 -0,117 0,022 0,090 
5 -0,297 -0,974 -0,419 -1,510 
6 -0,326 -1,070 -0,546 -1,300 
7 0,059 0,195 0,046 0,130 
8 -0,023 -0,075 0,010 0,038 
9 0,172 0,564 -0,028 -0,106 
10 0,496 1,627 0,363 1,458 
 
We may therefore interpret that investors’ first reaction was positive in the M&A news, 
even though the following days we notice a rather uncertain and volatile situation, in 
contrast to the return values a few days before the announcement date. Furthermore, 
on day -9, using both methods, we observe an increase in the AAR of 0,56%, which was 
statistically significant at level 10%. This unexpected rise of the price can be considered 
as a result of information leakage through informal channels or even price manipulation.   
As far as the CAARs are concerned, we notice in Table 6 that in the event period (-5,-1) 
there was a positive statistically significant value of the AAR, (1,26%), at level 10% in the 
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market model method. In the market model analysis we also observe statistically 
significant results in the event periods (-1,+1) and (-1,0), values of 1,4% (at level 5%) and 
1,7% (at level 1%) respectively. Especially for CAAR in the event period (-1,0), the results 
were similar for both methods, which show statistical significance at level 1%. We may 
therefore conclude that in vertical M&As during the period 2008-2018, bidders enjoyed 
positive CAAR around the event period (+10,-10) and that there was probably an 
information leakage in the market prior to the announcement date, as returns changed 
more than expected.  
Table 6. CAARs of bidders in vertical M&As 
INTERVAL 
MARKET MODEL MARKET ADJUSTED MODEL 
CAAR % T-TEST CAAR % T-TEST 
CAAR (-10 +10) 1,471 1,053 0,135 0,097 
CAAR (-10 -1) 1,264* 1,311 0,815 0,845 
CAAR (+1 +10) 1,471 1,526 -0,227 -0,225 
CAAR (-5 +5) 1,093 1,081 0,291 0,287 
CAAR (-5 -1) 1,264* 1,854 0,815 1,195 
CAAR (+1 +5) 1,093 1,603 0,291 0,426 
CAAR (-1 +1) 1,395** 2,641 0,818 1,550 
CAAR (-1 0) 1,690*** 3,920 1,233*** 2,860 
 
Post AARs were not statistically significant, which may imply that the announcement of 
a vertical M&A in automotive industry probably did not increase the wealth of 
shareholder’s value significantly, and the reaction did not constitute much 
consideration. 
Comparing the results between horizontal and vertical M&A type for acquiring firms, we 
may conclude that there were some notable differences. We found statistically 
significance in the AAR of bidders of horizontal M&As both around the announcement 
date and days before the announcement, all of which with negative figures. While in the 
case of vertical deals there was only little significance 9 days before the event was 
announced. This may indicate that horizontal mergers were of most serious concern 
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from the shareholder’s point of view. CAAR’s also showed similar results as per the AARs. 
We may see from the Table 5 and 7, that all event windows in the horizontal cases were 
negative statistically significant, most of them in a high level of 1%. However, CAAR’s 
from vertical deals seemed to show positive significance at such high level only in the 
event window (-1,0), using both models. 
5.2 Average abnormal returns of targets 
In this section, the results of our event study are provided for the targets engaged in 
either horizontal or vertical M&As in automotive industry for the period 2008-2018. 
5.2.1 Targets in horizontal M&As 
In Table 7 we examined the average abnormal returns of targets in horizontal mergers. 
We observed that on the announcement day the market reacted positively to the news 
and the AAR on day 0 were statistically significant. Prior to the announcement the AAR 
were usually positive except for day -10 and day -1 in the market model when they were 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level. As a result, the shareholders and the 
investors may be confused and worried about the rumors concerned the mergers and 
their expectations were blur.  
Table 7. AARs of Targets in horizontal M&As 
DATE 
ANNOUNCED 
MARKET MODEL MARKET ADJUSTED MODEL 
N=56 AAR% T-TEST AAR% T-TEST 
-10 -0,961** -2,316 -0,979* -1,903 
-9 -0,087 -0,210 -0,022 -0,051 
-8 -0,147 -0,354 -0,115 -0,246 
-7 0,250 0,603 0,575* 1,933 
-6 0,426 1,027 0,507 1,215 
-5 0,524 1,263 0,498 1,379 
-4 0,297 0,716 0,133 0,461 
-3 0,452 1,090 0,691* 1,976 
-2 0,811* 1,954 0,810* 1,711 
[50] 
 
-1 -3,171*** -7,646 -3,107 -1,441 
0 1,058** 2,551 1,234** 2,176 
1 0,460 1,109 0,349 0,445 
2 -1,285*** -3,097 -1,333** -2,345 
3 0,692 1,669 0,571 0,698 
4 -0,598 -1,443 -0,673** -2,008 
5 -0,241 -0,582 -0,225 -0,699 
6 -0,248 -0,599 -0,413 -0,595 
7 -0,303 -0,731 -0,264 -0,912 
8 -0,544 -1,312 -0,300 -0,982 
9 -0,641 -1,545 -0,576 -1,476 
10 0,592 1,427 0,587** 2,113 
 
What is more, after the announcement AAR on day 2 and 4 were negative and 
statistically significant in market adjusted model, while 10 days after the announcement 
the AARs were positive. In general, our research concluded that post-announcement 
period presented negative but not statistically significant AAR the most days. 
CAAR of targets of horizontal M&As are showed in Table 8. They were negative in most 
windows examined both in market model and market adjusted model. The CAAR of the 
total window period (-10,+10) was negative in both models but not statistically 
significant.  
Table 8. CAARs of Targets in horizontal M&As 
INTERVAL 
MARKET MODEL MARKET ADJUSTED MODEL 
CAAR % T-TEST CAAR % T-TEST 
CAAR (-10 +10) -2,665** -1,402 -2,052 -1,080 
CAAR (-10 -1) -1,606 -1,225 -1,009 -0,770 
CAAR (+1 +10) -2,665** -2,032 -2,052 -1,565 
CAAR (-5 +5) -1,520 -1,105 -1,086 -0,790 
CAAR (-5 -1) -1,606* -1,732 -1,009 -1,088 
CAAR (+1 +5) -1,520 -1,639 -1,086 -1,171 
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CAAR (-1 +1) -0,088 -0,123 0,574 0,799 
CAAR (-1 0) -0,548 -0,935 0,225 0,384 
CAARs of the targets were statistical significant for the windows (+1,+10) and (-5,-1) and 
they were negative reflecting the market uncertainty for the upcoming merger. 
5.2.2 Targets in vertical M&As  
As it is depicted on the Table 9, based on the market model there was a strong statistical 
significance of positive abnormal returns from the day of the announcement until day 
4. Especially on the day of the announcement, the next day of the deal announcement 
and the fourth day not only was the returns high but they were also significant at 1% 
level. For example, on day 1 the AARs reached a peak accounted for approximately 
2,419% which means that the investors and generally market’s expectations were strong 
and positive.  
Table 9. AARs of Targets in vertical M&As 
DATE 
ANNOUNCED 
MARKET MODEL RETURNS 
MARKET ADJUSTED 
MODEL 
N=36 AAR% T-TEST AAR% T-TEST 
-10 0,080 0,179 -0,055 -0,124 
-9 -0,351 -0,782 -0,310 -0,699 
-8 0,689 1,535 0,620 1,001 
-7 1,626*** 3,622 1,709** 2,399 
-6 0,384 0,855 0,438 0,801 
-5 -0,149 -0,332 -0,271 -0,541 
-4 -0,274 -0,610 -0,180 -0,399 
-3 0,375 0,836 0,531 1,120 
-2 0,037 0,082 0,175 0,358 
-1 -0,346 -0,770 -0,277 -0,581 
0 1,942*** 4,326 1,676 1,112 
1 2,419*** 5,388 2,310 1,603 
2 0,908* 2,023 0,743 0,792 
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3 0,874* 1,946 0,961 1,527 
4 1,390*** 3,097 1,104 1,031 
5 0,366 0,816 0,276 0,379 
6 0,634 1,412 0,477 0,972 
7 -0,500 -1,113 -0,552 -1,193 
8 -0,439 -0,977 -0,573 -1,418 
9 -0,078 -0,173 -0,015 -0,026 
10 -0,155 -0,345 -0,301 -0,788 
 
Before day 0 the only day on which statistically significant returns appeared was day -7 
which was the only day that was statistically significant in both models. Generally 
speaking, AAR in the market model from the day of the announcement until the fourth 
day presented substantial positive abnormal returns, then on day 5 and day 6 the 
average returns were neutral (around zero) showing that the market started to adopt to 
the new situation, while after the seventh day the sign became negative and the returns 
fell, maybe indicating shareholders’ uncertainty. However, AARs in the Market Adjusted 
Model were not statistically significant around the announcement day but they were 
close to the critical value indicating that there may have been a weak statistical signal. 
CAARs of targets participating on vertical M&As indicated strong statistically significant 
evidence (usually significant at 1% level). In Table 10, CAARs in different windows were 
positive and very high.  
Table 10. CAARs of Targets in vertical M&As 
INTERVAL 
MARKET MODEL 
MARKET ADJUSTED 
MODEL 
CAAR % T-TEST CAAR % T-TEST 
CAAR (-10 +10) 9,434*** 4,586 8,485*** 4,125 
CAAR (-10 -1) 2,072 1,459 2,379 1,676 
CAAR (+1 +10) 9,434*** 6,645 8,485*** 5,977 
CAAR (-5 +5) 9,971*** 6,697 9,450*** 6,347 
CAAR (-5 -1) 2,072** 2,064 2,379** 2,370 
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CAAR (+1 +5) 9,971*** 9,933 9,450*** 9,414 
CAAR (-1 +1) 6,433*** 8,273 6,366*** 8,187 
CAAR (-1 0) 4,014*** 6,322 4,055*** 6,387 
 
There was significance in almost all event windows and in most cases the significance 
level was at 1%. The only exception was CAAR (-10,-1) which was not significant in both 
models.  
Comparing the results of targets in both M&A types, there were both similarities and 
differences. On the announcement date (day 0) there were statistically significant AARs, 
positive in both cases. This may indicate the shareholders’ approval in the M&A 
transaction. On the other hand, on days 1 and 2 results were different. In vertical M&As, 
AARs on day 1 showed positive reaction of 2.42% in market model, significant at a level 
of 1%. In the horizontal case on day 2 the AARs were negative, 1.33% at a significant 
level of 1%. In addition, CAARs showed totally different results for both types. In vertical 
transactions, CAARs in almost all event windows were positive and statistically 
significant at a level of 1%. On the other hand, in the horizontal cases the results showed 
negative abnormal returns and statistical significance in the event windows (+10,+1) and 
(-5,-1). It seems that targets showed much volatility and positive reaction when it comes 
to vertical transactions rather than to horizontal ones. 
5.3 Post-M&A profitability of acquiring firms 
Having collected the ratios (ROE and Net Profit Margin) two years before and two years 
after the transaction was actually completed, we calculated the averages of the two 
years before and two years after the M&A.  
Using quantitative methods and paired-test analysis, we analyzed the below variables: 
• roe_a stands for the average ROE after the transaction, 
• roe_b stands for average ROE before the transaction, 
• margin_a stands for the average Net Profit Margin Ratio after the transaction, 
• margin_b stands for the average Net Profit Margin Ratio before the transaction. 
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The Tables 11 and 12 summarize the descriptive statistics of the pre-M&A and post-
M&A during the period examined for the acquiring companies. Descriptive statistics 
show the profitability performance of the firms based on accounting analysis, facilitating 
the comparison of profits evaluation before and after the integration. As we observe in 
Table 11, the post-M&A ROE (0.1420) was slightly lower than pre-M&A ROE (0.1704) 
and standard deviation reduced after the transaction, showing a lower post-M&A 
uncertainty (0.910). Finally, the minimum values our variables taken were very close 
while max values of variables presented a big difference.   
Table 11. Summary of roe_a and roe_b. (Source: STATA) 
 
Regarding the Net Profit Margin Ratio that illustrates the companies’ ability to generate 
profits, average net profit margin ratio seemed to be similar before and after the M&A 
(around 0.05), Table 12. 
Table 12. Summary of margin_a and margin_b (Source: STATA) 
 
Standard deviation of the Net Profit Margin Ratio was low and similar both in the pre-
M&A and the post-M&A period and the minimum and maximum values were also 
identical, indicating that there was not a significant difference on this ratio two years 
before and after the deal. According to previous studies that presented in the 
methodology section, performance ratios did not always follow an upward, stable or 
downward trend after the M&A. In our case the ROE showed a slight negative 
performance after the M&A while Net Profit Margin Ratio remained stable. 
Consequently, we generated two variables on Stata:  
       roe_b          34    .1704412     .146897     -.0605      .7215
       roe_a          34    .1420735    .0910929     -.0715      .3675
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summ roe_a roe_b
    margin_b          34    .0508971    .0316057      -.018       .131
    margin_a          34    .0524265    .0281347      -.015      .1125
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summ margin_a margin_b
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• roediff represents the difference between the average ROE of two years before 
with two years preceding the integration and   
• margindiff represents the difference between the average net profit margin ratio 
two years before with two years after the merger. 
The Figure 10 depicts the distribution of the differences in ROE and Net Profit Margin 
Ratio between the period after and the period before the M&A. As it is shown in the left 
histogram, the vast majority (around 85%) of the ROE differences was concentrated 
between -0.2 and 0.2, indicating that there was a slight difference in the ratios while a 
small amount of observations presented a difference of around -0.6 to -0.8 or -0.2 to -
0.4. On the other hand, the right histogram of the Net Profit Margin differences 
presented a normal distribution shape and 40% of the observations appeared to have a 
zero value.   
Figure 10. Histograms of roediff and margindiff (Source: STATA) 
 
We conducted paired sample t-Test using STATA in order to explore whether there was 
a significant difference on the mean of average of the profitability ratios – namely Net 
Profit Margin and ROE – at 5% significant level before and after the M&A.  
Concerning the ROE, based on the Table 13, the mean difference before and after the 
transaction was around -0.0283 and the confidence interval of the true value laid 
between -0.0836 and 0.02690 in 95% confidence interval.  
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Table 13. T-test for ROE variable (Source: STATA) 
 
As the Table 13 above shows, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the difference 
between the pre- and post- M&A ROE was zero, because the p-value exceeds 0.05. This 
means that for the period 2008-2018, there was no significant difference in the ROE 
performance of the automotive acquirors after the completion of the deal. 
Based on the Table 14, the mean Net Profit Margin Ratio difference was detrimental, 
accounting for 0.0015 with a low standard deviation (0.0344).  
Table 14. T-test for Profit Margin variable (Source: STATA) 
 
Similar to ROE case, paired sample t-Test for Profit Margin Ratio showed the same 
results. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there was a statistically 
significant difference on Net Profit Margin Ratio before and after the M&A, because p-
value was estimated 0.7976, which is greater than 0.05. The Profit Margin Ratio 
difference ranked between -0.010 and 0.01356 at 95% confidence level. These results 
are consistent to the Sujud & Boutheina’s study (2018), who also found that there is not 
a significant positive effect on ROE two years before and two years after the M&A. 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1520         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3040          Pr(T > t) = 0.8480
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       33
     mean(diff) = mean(roe_a - roe_b)                             t =  -1.0442
                                                                              
    diff        34   -.0283676    .0271669    .1584088   -.0836391    .0269038
                                                                              
   roe_b        34    .1704412    .0251926     .146897    .1191864     .221696
   roe_a        34    .1420735    .0156223    .0910929    .1102897    .1738573
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Paired t test
. ttest  roe_a== roe_b
 Pr(T < t) = 0.6012         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7976          Pr(T > t) = 0.3988
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       33
     mean(diff) = mean(margin_a - margin_b)                       t =   0.2586
                                                                              
    diff        34    .0015294    .0059143    .0344858   -.0105033    .0135621
                                                                              
margin_b        34    .0508971    .0054203    .0316057    .0398693    .0619248
margin_a        34    .0524265    .0048251    .0281347    .0426098    .0622431
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Paired t test
. ttest  margin_a== margin_b
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6 Conclusion 
Mergers and Acquisitions consist a popular corporate strategy examined by academics 
the last decades, as an increasing number of automotive companies decide either to 
acquire or to be acquired for economic and managerial reasons. The fact that several 
researches present contradictory findings (Warter & Warter, 2016), it makes obligatory 
throughout analysis of the results to be applied and intrigues the interest of different 
parties such as investors, shareholders and governance. In our research we focused on 
the automotive sector and we elaborated on the possible different reactions of the 
investors on the first public announcement of the M&A, based on the type of M&A, 
horizontal and vertical. 
Having examined AAR and CAAR for both bidders and targets, for both horizontal and 
vertical M&A types, we can now have an overall conclusion. Comparing the horizontal 
and vertical types, we see that CAARs for both acquiring and target firms in vertical 
M&As were positive in all event windows, while in the case of horizontal transactions 
CAARs performed mostly negative figures. As theory suggests, targets usually take the 
most benefits of the transaction as their returns usually increase substantially in 
comparison with the acquirors’ returns which often remain stable (Capron & Pistre, 
2002). Regarding the target’s performance in vertical integration, our research confirms 
this statement, as high CAARs were estimated in almost all windows. Not only were 
CAARs high, but they were also found both positive and statistically significant, thus 
indicating how much targets ameliorated their position with the M&A announcement. 
Similar results were found by Gross’s and Lindstandt’s study who indicated that among 
industries which are well-known for their M&A activity, in the automotive sector, the 
targets present the highest CAAR (27.5%). However, we need to point the unexpected 
results of targets’ CAARs in the horizontal M&As which were reported negative (-2,6%) 
but statistically significant (at 5%) only in the event windows (+1,+10) and (-10,+10). 
On the other hand, bidders of horizontal M&As performed CAAR (-10,+10) of -3,7% 
(market adjusted model) showed negative and statistically significant CAARs pre- and 
post- event announcement, while in vertical cases, CAARs appeared to be positive with 
little statistical significance, except from event window (-1,0), where it was reported 
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CAAR of 1,7% (1% significant level). Thus, bidder’s abnormal returns in our study were 
not found null in accordance with Capron & Pistre (2002) but they calculated lower than 
the corresponding target’s CAAR’s. Therefore, our findings support Martynova & 
Renneboog’s research (2008) that some bidders may perform “small losses”. 
Furthermore, comparing the two main M&A types, horizontal or vertical, our findings 
come in contrast with the study of (Kedia, Ravid, & Pons, 2008), who found that 
horizontal mergers resulted to significantly higher returns and vertical M&As reported 
negative abnormal returns after 1996. In our research, vertical M&As were reported 
positive and higher abnormal returns than companies engaged in horizontal M&As. 
Therefore, it seems that vertical M&As from 2008 until recently have been revised in the 
investor and corporate management audience. Shareholders endorse and welcome 
vertical integration as means for profitability and efficiency; also have expectations of 
value creation and positive market performance.  
All in all, our findings support what previous studies and researches argued as for the 
capture of the gains by the target firms rather than by the bidder ones (Capron & Pistre, 
2002), Corporate Finance (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011), (Fresard, Hoberg, & Phillips, 
2013). In our analysis, even in the case of horizontal mergers when both acquirors and 
bidders performed negative CAARs, target’s negative CAAR were mainly lower, 
indicating smaller return loss. Finally, we are likely to verify our initial expectations, 
which concerned the relation of market reaction to the M&A type. We may conclude 
that until today the type of the transaction plays important role in the outcome and the 
consequences of a potential M&A. 
According to the accounting-based analysis we followed, we concluded that there was 
not a significant improvement on profitability ratios (ROE and Profit Margin Ratio) of the 
acquiring firms during 2008-2018. Similarly to our results, Mishra and Chandra  found 
out that no long-run profitability ratios increases after an M&A (Mishra & Chandra, 
2010). No evidence of performance ratio amelioration has also been supported from 
some researches such as Sujud & Boutheina (2018) and Akinbli and Kelilume (2013).  
Collectively, these findings suggest that further research on the phenomenon of merger 
and acquisition within the automotive industry is required. The limitations in our study 
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concern major factors which were not taken into account, such as the method of 
payment in relation to the abnormal returns. Alternatively, another challenge for future 
research could be the examination of the effects on aggregate abnormal returns for the 
companies (target and bidder) before merger and the abnormal returns of the group 
company afterwards in automotive sector.  
Moreover, our analysis did not include the groups emerged after the completion of the 
merger, but we only investigated the performance of the acquiring firms.  What is more, 
in the accounting-based analysis, we only examined the post-M&A performance of the 
acquiring firms, without considering target companies whatsoever. In order to examine 
the post-M&A performance of the target companies, we should determine which of 
them ceased to exist and merged with the bidder company and which of them remained 
active and continued trading their shares in the stock exchange. Finally, further 
investigation may be carried out in other financial ratios, such as leverage or operation 
both in horizontal and vertical transactions, in order to gain full insight of the 
effectiveness and profitability of M&As in the automotive companies.  
To sum up, the overall success of most M&As remains subject to further research and 
discussions. Some failures, like the divestment of Rover by BMW and Chrysler by 
Daimler, further amplify the need to assess the motivations and the determinants that 
influence and may explain the complex process in all stages of M&As. Corporate 
management obtains useful information for future decisions. Moreover, the results of 
this study would be of essential value to potential shareholders and investors of 
automotive firms. The fact that an M&A creates or destroy value for automotive 
corporations may undoubtedly affect the decisions and the movements of potential 
investors. 
[60] 
 
Bibliography 
Altunbas, Y., & Marqués, D. (2008). Mergers and acquisitions and bank performance in Europe: 
The role of strategic similarities. Journal of Economics and Business, p. 209. 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001). New Evidence and Perspectives on. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, pp. Pages 103–120. 
Berk, J., & Peter, D. (2017). Corporate Finance. Pearson. 
Bhattacharyya, S., & Amrita, N. (2009, January). Horizontal acquisitions and buyingpower: A 
product market analysis. JournalofFinancialEconomics. 
Bloomberg. (April 2019). Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-
04-01/the-auto-industry-is-overdue-a-bout-of-mega-mergers 
Brealey, Myers, & Allen. (2011). Principals in Corporate Fincance.  
Brown, S., & Warner, J. (1985). Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies. Journal of 
Financial Economics, pp. 3-31. 
Capron, L., & Pistre, N. (2002, July ). When do acquirers earn abnormal returns? Strategic 
management journal, pp. 781-794. 
Ellis, N. (2014). When the parts are greater than the sum: An event study analysis of vertical, 
horizontal, and conglomerate mergers. 
Faccio, M., & W. Masulis, R. (2005, JUNE). The Choice of Payment Method in European. THE 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE. 
Farrell, J., & Shapiro, C. (1990, March). Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis. The 
American Economic Review, pp. 107-126. 
FInancial Times. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/fa5db2ba-5202-11e9-
b401-8d9ef1626294 
Financial Times. (March 2019). Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/16cfba1c-5238-
11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294 
Fresard, L., Hoberg, G., & Phillips, G. (2013, 09 24). The Incentives for Vertical Mergers and 
Vertical Integration. 
Girma, S., Wright, P. W., Conyon, M. J., & Thompson, S. (2002). The Impact of Mergers and 
Acquisitions on Company Employment in the United Kingdom. European Economic 
Review. 
Gross, S. K., & Lindstädt, H. (2005-2006). HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL TAKEOVER AND SELL-
OFF. Virtus Interpress, pp. 23-30. 
[61] 
 
Hackbarth, D., & Morellec, E. (2008). Stock Returns in Mergers and Acquisitions. The Journal of 
Finance. 
Halpern, P. (1983, May). Corporate Acquisitions: A Theory of Special Cases? A Review of Event 
Studies Applied to Acquisitions. Journal of Finance, pp. 297-317. 
Hay, G. A., & Werden, G. (1993). Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, and Economics. Cornell Law 
Faculty Publications. 
Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G., & Ruback, R. S. (1992). Does corporate performance improve after 
mergers? Financial Economics. 
James, S. (2005). Horizontal Alliances and the Merger Paradox. Managerial and decision 
economics, pp. 243-248. 
Kedia, S., Ravid, S. A., & Pons, V. (2008). VERTICAL MERGERS AND THE MARKET VALUATION OF 
THE BENEFITS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION. 
Kouvelis, P., & Milner, J. (2002, August). Supply chain capacity and outsourcing decisions: the 
dynamic interplay of demand and supply uncertainty. Supply chain capacity and 
outsourcing decisions: the dynamic interplay of demand and supply uncertainty. 
KPMG. (2019). Retrieved from 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/se/pdf/komm/2019/Global-Automotive-
Executive-Survey-2019-Summary.pdf 
Krivin, D., Patton, R., Rose, E., & Tabak, D. (2003, November). DETERMINATION OF THE 
APPROPRIATE EVENT WINDOW LENGTH. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
Lin, Y.‐T., Parlaktürk, A. K., & Swaminathan, J. M. (2014). Vertical Integration under 
Competition: Forward, Backward, or No Integration? 
Lommerud, K. E., Odd Rune , S., & Lars , S. (2001, January). Downstream merger with upstream 
market power. European Economic Review, pp. 717 – 743. 
Long, P. H. (2015, June ). Merger and Acquisitions in the Czech Banking Sector-Impact of Bank 
Mergers on the Efficiency of Banks. Journal of Advanced Management Science . 
LUBATKlN, M. (1987). MERGER STRATEGIES AND STOCKHOLDER VALUE. Strategic 
Management Journal, pp. 39-53 . 
Ma, J., Chu, Y., & Pagán, J. A. (2009). Abnormal Returns to Mergers and Acquisitions in Ten 
Asian Stock Markets. International Journal of Business, pp. 238-239. 
MacKinlay, A. C. (1997, March ). Event Studies in Economics and Finance. Journal of Economic 
Literature. 
Marangu, K. (2007). EFFECTS OF MERGERS ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF NON LISTED 
BANKS IN KENYA. SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI. 
[62] 
 
Markides, C., & Oyon, D. (1998, April). International acquisitions: Do they create value for 
shareholders? Elsevier, pp. 125-135. 
Martin, K. J. (1996, September). The method of payment in corporate acquisitions, investment 
opportunities,. Journal of Finance, pp. 1227-1246. 
Martynova, M., & Renneboog, L. (2008, January). A century of corporate takeovers: What have 
we learned and where do we stand? Journal of Banking & Finance, pp. 2148–2177. 
Matsushima, N., & Mizuno, T. (2009, September). Vertical separation as a defense against 
strong suppliers. Japan: Osaka University. 
Mishra, P., & Chandra, T. (2010). Mergers, acquisitions and firms’ performance: Experience of 
Indian. Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, pp. 111-126. 
Otieno, O. D., & Kemunto, S. L. (2017). Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions on the Financial 
Performance of Commercial Banks in Kenya. Research Journal of Finance and 
Accounting, p. 70. 
Patel, R. (2018). Pre & Post-Merger Financial Performance: An Indian Perspective. Journal of 
Central Banking Theory and Practice, pp. 181-200. 
PWC. (December 2019). Retrieved from https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/industrial-
products/library/automotive-supplier-consolidation-study.html 
Raisch, S. (2004). Dynamic Strategic Analysis.  
Ravenscraft, David, J., & Scherer, F. (1989, March ). The profitability of mergers. International 
Journal of Industrial Organisation, pp. 101-116. 
Scholes, M., & Joseph, W. (1977, December ). Estimating betas from nonsynchronous data. 
Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 309-327. 
Stuckey, J., & White, D. (1993). When and When Not to Vertically Integrate. 
Sujud, H., & Boutheina , H. (2018, March). Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions on Performance 
of Lebanese Banks. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics. 
Tarigan, J., Claresta, A., & Hatane, S. E. (2018). ANALYSIS OF MERGER & ACQUISITION MOTIVES 
IN INDONESIAN LISTED COMPANIES THROUGH FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
PERSPECTIVE. 
Wansley, J. W., Lane, W. R., & Yang, H. C. (2019). Abnormal Returns To Acquired Firms By Type 
of Acquisition and Method of Payment. Financial Management Association 
International Stable. 
Warter, L., & Warter, I. (2016). THE PHENOMENON OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION WITHIN 
THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY. North International Conference on Economics, pp. 214-
220. 
[63] 
 
Zhang, D. (2013). The Revival of Vertical Integration: Strategic Choice and Performance 
Influences. 
Ziva, R.-B. (2017, November ). Comparison of merger and acquisition (M&A) success in 
horizontal, vertical and conglomerate M&As: industry sector vs. services sector . 
Service Industries Journal , pp. 1-27. 
 
 
 
 
[64] 
 
Appendix 
Table A 1. SIC codes categories included /excluded in the population of vertical M&As 
Range of SIC codes Division Include / exclude 
0100-0999 Agriculture, forestry and fishing Exclude all 
1000-1499 Mining Include  
1500-1799 Construction Exclude all 
1800-1999 Not used Exclude all 
2000-3999 Manufacturing Include 
4000-4999 
Transportation, communications, electric, gas 
and sanitary service 
Include 
5000-5199 Wholesale trade Include 
5200-5999 Retail trade Include 
6000-6799 Finance, insurance and real estate Exclude all 
7000-8999 Services Include 
9100-9729 Public administration Exclude all 
9900-9999 Nonclassifiable Exclude all 
 
Table A 2. SIC codes of forward targets in vertical M&As 
Sic code Operation Vertical type 
3715 Truck trailers forward 
3716 Motor homes forward 
3792 Traver trailers forward 
3799 Transportation ecquipement forward 
4111 Local and suburban transit forward 
4119 Local passenger transportation forward 
4121 Taxicabs forward 
4141 Local bus charter services forward 
4212 Local trucking forward 
4213 Trucking, except local forward 
4215 Courier services except air forward 
4724 Travel agencies forward 
4725 Tour operators forward 
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4729 Arrangement of passenger transportation forward 
4731 Arrangement of tranportation of freigth and cargo forward 
4789 Transportation services forward 
4971 Irrigation systems forward 
5012 Automobiles and other motor vehicles forward 
5083 Farm and garden machinery forward 
5088 Transportation equipment & supplies forward 
5511 New and used car dealers forward 
5521 Used car dealers forward 
5531 Auto and home supply stores forward 
5561 Trailer dealers forward 
5571 Motocycle dealers forward 
5599 Automotive dealers, nec forward 
7359 Equipment rental & leasing, nec forward 
7514 Passenger car rental forward 
7515 Passenger car leasing forward 
7532 Top & body repair & paint shops forward 
7534 Tire repair stores forward 
7538 General automotive repair shops forward 
7539 Automotive repair shops, nec forward 
7542 Carwashes forward 
 
Table A 3 SIC codes of backward targets in vertical M&As 
Sic code Operation Vertical type 
1041 Gold ores Backward 
1061 Ferroalloy ores, except vanadium Backward 
1222 Bituninous coal and lignite surface mining Backward 
1311 Crude petroleum and natural gas Backward 
1382 Oil and gas field exploration  Backward 
1446 Industrial sand Backward 
1479 Chemical and fertilizer mineral mining Backward 
2813 Industrial gases Backward 
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2819 Industrial inorganic chemicals  Backward 
2821 Plastics materials and synthetic resigns Backward 
2823 Cellulosic manmade fibers Backward 
2851 Paints, varnishes, lacquers and allied products Backward 
2861 Gum and wood chemicals Backward 
2869 Industrial organic chemicals Backward 
2891 Adhesives and sealants Backward 
2899 Chemicals Backward 
2911 Petroleum refining Backward 
3011 Tires and tubes Backward 
3052 Rubber and plastic hose and belting Backward 
3069 Fabricated rubber prod Backward 
3081 Unsupported plastics film and sheet Backward 
3089 Plastic products Backward 
3211 Flat glass Backward 
3229 Plessed and blown glass Backward 
3231 Glass products Backward 
3292 Asbestos products Backward 
3312 Steel works, blast furnaces Backward 
3321 Gray and ductile iron foundries Backward 
3322 Malleable iron foundries Backward 
3325 Steel foundries Backward 
3341 Secondary nonferrous metals Backward 
3356 Other metals Backward 
3357 Drawing and insulating noferrous wire Backward 
3363 Aluminum die casting Backward 
3365 Aluminum foundries Backward 
3399 Primary metal products Backward 
3429 Metal Backward 
3441 Metal Backward 
3442 Metal Backward 
3443 Metal Backward 
3444 Metal Backward 
3449 Metal Backward 
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3452 Bolts, nuts, screws Backward 
3462 Iron and steel forgings Backward 
3465 Automobtive stampings Backward 
3469 Metal stampings Backward 
3479 Coating, engraving and allied services Backward 
3484 Small arms Backward 
3492 Fluid power valves Backward 
3494 Pipes Backward 
3498 Pipes Backward 
3499 Metal products Backward 
3511 Turbines Backward 
3519 Internal combustion engines, nec Backward 
3523 Farm machinery and equipment Backward 
3531 Construction machinery Backward 
3532 Mining machinery Backward 
3533 Oil and gas machinery Backward 
3537 Industrial trucks and tractors Backward 
3541 Tools Backward 
3548 Tools Backward 
3549 Tools Backward 
3559 Special industry machinery, nec Backward 
3561 Machinery Backward 
3566 Machinery Backward 
3567 Machinery Backward 
3568 Machinery Backward 
3569 Machinery Backward 
3571 Electronic computers Backward 
3572 Computer storage devices Backward 
3585 Heating equipement Backward 
3589 Machines Backward 
3592 Pistons Backward 
3593 Tools Backward 
3599 Machines Backward 
3612 Power distributors Backward 
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3621 Motors and generators Backward 
3624 Carbon and graphite products Backward 
3629 Electrical industrial apparatus Backward 
3648 Lighting equipement Backward 
3661 Telephone apparetus Backward 
3663 Telephone apparetus Backward 
3669 Communication ecquipement Backward 
3674 Semiconductors and related devices Backward 
3677 Electronic coils transformers Backward 
3678 Electronic connectors Backward 
3679 Electronic components, nec Backward 
3691 Storage batteries Backward 
3692 Batteries Backward 
3694 Electric ecquipement for combustion engines Backward 
3699 Electric ecquipement Backward 
3714 Motor vehicle parts & accessories Backward 
3751 Motorcycles, bicycles, and parts Backward 
3812 Navigation ecquipement Backward 
3822 Environmental controls Backward 
3829 Measuring devices Backward 
3999 Manufacturing industries Backward 
4812 Radiotelephone communications Backward 
4911 Electric services Backward 
4922 Natural gas Backward 
4953 Refuse systems Backward 
5013 Motor vehicle supplies and new parts Backward 
5014 Tires and tubes Backward 
5015 Motor vehicle parts, used Backward 
5051 Metals services centers and offices Backward 
5162 Plastic materials Backward 
5171 Petroleum bulk stations Backward 
5172 Petroleum bulk stations Backward 
5541 Gasoline services stations Backward 
5734 Computer software stores Backward 
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7319 Advertising Backward 
7336 Commercial art and graphic design Backward 
7371 Computer programming services Backward 
7372 Prepackaged software Backward 
7373 Computer integrated systems design Backward 
7374 Data processing and preparation Backward 
7375 Information retrieval services Backward 
7376 Computer facilities management Backward 
7389 Business services, nec Backward 
7549 Automotive services, nec Backward 
7623 Refrigeration and air conditioning services Backward 
8711 Engineering services Backward 
8731 Commercial physical research Backward 
8734 Testing laboratories Backward 
8744 Facilities support management services Backward 
8748 Business consulting, nec Backward 
 
Table A 4. Number of horizontal and vertical M&As during 2008-2018  
PERIOD 
HORIZONTAL DEALS 
 
VERTICAL DEALS 
NUMBER OF 
DEALS 
%of total (2008-
2018) 
NUMBER OF 
DEALS 
% of total (2008-
2018) 
2008 74 13,86% 85 11,60% 
2009 76 14,23% 70 9,55% 
2010 51 9,55% 71 9,69% 
2011 66 12,36% 52 7,09% 
2012 50 9,36% 42 5,73% 
2013 38 7,12% 54 7,37% 
2014 38 7,12% 52 7,09% 
2015 31 5,81% 73 9,96% 
2016 34 6,37% 65 8,87% 
2017 37 6,93% 78 10,64% 
2018 39 7,30% 91 12,41% 
Total 534 100,00% 733 100,00% 
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Table A 5. Acquirors’ nation per M&A type 
Acquiror nation 
Nation 
Horizontal M&As Vertical M&As 
Number of 
deals 
% of total 
Number of 
deals 
% of total 
China 165 30,90% 171 23,33% 
Germany 56 10,49% 74 10,10% 
United States 55 10,30% 127 17,33% 
France 34 6,37% 25 3,41% 
Japan 32 5,99% 60 8,19% 
Italy 31 5,81% 17 2,32% 
India 23 4,31% 43 5,87% 
Russian Fed 23 4,31% 29 3,96% 
South Korea 14 2,62% 35 4,77% 
United Kingdom 13 2,43% 22 3,00% 
Netherlands 10 1,87% 5 0,68% 
Sweden 8 1,50% 14 1,91% 
Brazil 8 1,50% 7 0,95% 
Spain 6 1,12% 4 0,55% 
Canada 6 1,12% 14 1,91% 
Malaysia 6 1,12% 14 1,91% 
Finland 4 0,75% 4 0,55% 
Switzerland 3 0,56% 4 0,55% 
Czech Republic 3 0,56% 6 0,82% 
Turkey 3 0,56% 8 1,09% 
Ukraine 3 0,56% 4 0,55% 
Hong Kong 3 0,56% 9 1,23% 
Vietnam 3 0,56% 5 0,68% 
Argentina 2 0,37% - - 
Belgium 2 0,37% - - 
Portugal 2 0,37% 2 0,27% 
Indonesia 2 0,37% 3 0,41% 
Tunisia 1 0,19% - - 
Taiwan 1 0,19% 5 0,68% 
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Cyprus 1 0,19% - - 
Mexico 1 0,19% - - 
Thailand 1 0,19% 3 0,41% 
Egypt 1 0,19% 1 0,14% 
Uzbekistan 1 0,19% - - 
Norway 1 0,19% - - 
Hungary 1 0,19% - - 
Austria 1 0,19% 3 0,41% 
New Zealand 1 0,19% 1 0,14% 
Luxembourg 1 0,19% 3 0,41% 
Saudi Arabia 1 0,19% - - 
Australia 1 0,19% - - 
Poland - - 3 0,41% 
Greece - - 2 0,27% 
Iran - - 1 0,14% 
Kenya - - 1 0,14% 
Kazakhstan - - 1 0,14% 
Utd Arab Em - - 1 0,14% 
Israel - - 1 0,14% 
Qatar - - 1 0,14% 
Total 534 100,00% 733 100,00% 
 
Table A 6. Targets’ nation per M&A type 
Target nation 
Nation 
Horizontal M&As Vertical M&As 
Number of 
deals 
% of total 
Number of 
deals 
% of total 
China 145 27,15% 167 22,78% 
United States 65 12,17% 131 17,87% 
Germany 35 6,55% 54 7,37% 
India 20 3,75% 39 5,32% 
Russian Fed 37 6,93% 35 4,77% 
Japan 18 3,37% 32 4,37% 
[72] 
 
South Korea 15 2,81% 31 4,23% 
Italy 25 4,68% 26 3,55% 
France 30 5,62% 24 3,27% 
United Kingdom 23 4,31% 21 2,86% 
Malaysia 8 1,50% 15 2,05% 
Canada 3 0,56% 14 1,91% 
Sweden 16 3,00% 11 1,50% 
Turkey 2 0,37% 10 1,36% 
Brazil 10 1,87% 9 1,23% 
Hong Kong 4 0,75% 9 1,23% 
Poland - - 9 1,23% 
Spain 5 0,94% 7 0,95% 
Indonesia 6 1,12% 6 0,82% 
Israel - - 6 0,82% 
Thailand 2 0,37% 6 0,82% 
Ukraine 3 0,56% 6 0,82% 
Austria - - 5 0,68% 
Taiwan 1 0,19% 5 0,68% 
Belgium 2 0,37% 4 0,55% 
Czech Republic 3 0,56% 4 0,55% 
Finland 4 0,75% 4 0,55% 
South Africa - - 4 0,55% 
Vietnam 4 0,75% 4 0,55% 
Greece - - 3 0,41% 
Mexico 2 0,37% 3 0,41% 
Philippines 1 0,19% 3 0,41% 
Argentina 4 0,75% 2 0,27% 
Denmark - - 2 0,27% 
Luxembourg - - 2 0,27% 
Netherlands 7 1,31% 2 0,27% 
Portugal 3 0,56% 2 0,27% 
Australia 6 1,12% 1 0,14% 
Belarus - - 1 0,14% 
Croatia 1 0,19% 1 0,14% 
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Egypt - - 1 0,14% 
Estonia - - 1 0,14% 
Hungary 1 0,19% 1 0,14% 
Iceland - - 1 0,14% 
Ireland-Rep - - 1 0,14% 
Morocco - - 1 0,14% 
New Zealand 1 0,19% 1 0,14% 
Norway 2 0,37% 1 0,14% 
Oman - - 1 0,14% 
Singapore - - 1 0,14% 
Slovak Rep - - 1 0,14% 
Slovenia 2 0,37% 1 0,14% 
Utd Arab Em - - 1 0,14% 
Kazakhstan 2 0,37% - - 
Serbia 2 0,37% - - 
Uzbekistan 2 0,37% - - 
Yugoslavia 2 0,37% - - 
Switzerland 2 0,37% - - 
Romania 1 0,19% - - 
Mauritius 1 0,19% - - 
Saudi Arabia 1 0,19% - - 
Colombia 1 0,19% - - 
Kenya 1 0,19% - - 
Bulgaria 1 0,19% - - 
Iran 1 0,19% - - 
Tunisia 1 0,19% - - 
Total 534 100,00% 733 100,00% 
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Table A 7. Horizontal M&As used for event period analysis 
Horizontal M&As 
Date announced Acquiror name Target name 
03/03/2008 Porsche Automobil Holding SE Volkswagen AG 
03/03/2008 Volkswagen AG Scania AB 
03/06/2008 Volkswagen AG MAN SE 
04/10/2008 Toyota Motor Corp Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd 
09/16/2008 Porsche Automobil Holding SE Volkswagen AG 
10/27/2008 Porsche Automobil Holding SE Audi AG 
01/05/2009 Porsche Automobil Holding SE Scania AB 
01/19/2009 Porsche Automobil Holding SE Volkswagen AG 
02/13/2009 Volkswagen AG Scania AB 
03/12/2009 PSA Peugeot Citroen SA Regie Natle Des Usines 
03/19/2009 Hyundai Motor Co Ltd Kia Motors Corp 
06/20/2009 Daimler Ag Porsche Automobil Holding SE 
07/14/2009 Ford Motor Co SC Automobile Craiova SA 
11/24/2009 Tata Motors Ltd Swaraj Mazda Ltd 
11/27/2009 Regie Natle Des Usines Avtovaz 
12/01/2009 MAN SE Scania AB 
12/03/2009 PSA Peugeot Citroen SA Mitsubishi Motors Corp 
12/09/2009 Volkswagen AG Suzuki Motor Corp 
03/17/2010 Geely Automobile Holdings Ltd 
Manganese Bronze Holdings 
PLC 
04/07/2010 Daimler Ag Nissan Motor Co Ltd 
04/07/2010 Daimler Ag Regie Natle Des Usines 
07/29/2010 Ashok Leyland Ltd Optare PLC 
11/15/2010 Scania AB MAN SE 
11/15/2010 Scania AB MAN SE 
11/19/2010 Nissan Motor Co Ltd Avtovaz 
11/23/2010 Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd Ssangyong Motor Co Ltd 
01/10/2011 Fiat SpA MAN SE 
01/11/2011 Fiat SpA Scania AB 
03/22/2011 GAC GAC Changfeng Motor Co Ltd 
04/14/2011 MAN SE Isuzu Motors Ltd 
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05/09/2011 Volkswagen AG MAN SE 
07/13/2011 Toyota Motor Corp Kanto Auto Works Ltd 
07/13/2011 Toyota Motor Corp Toyota Auto Body Co Ltd 
09/18/2011 Volkswagen AG Suzuki Motor Corp 
10/21/2011 Navistar International Corp Oshkosh Corp 
11/14/2011 Swaraj Automotives Ltd Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd 
11/25/2011 Isuzu Motors Ltd SML ISUZU Ltd 
12/20/2011 Ashok Leyland Ltd Optare PLC 
12/21/2011 Ashok Leyland Ltd Optare PLC 
01/09/2012 Drb-Hicom Bhd Proton Holdings Berhad 
01/16/2012 Drb-Hicom Bhd Proton Holdings Berhad 
02/29/2012 General Motors Co PSA Peugeot Citroen SA 
04/12/2012 Volkswagen AG MAN SE 
04/29/2012 General Motors Co Isuzu Motors Ltd 
01/23/2013 Marcopolo SA New Flyer Industries Inc 
02/14/2013 Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd Ssangyong Motor Co Ltd 
09/13/2013 Sollers UAZ 
02/21/2014 Volkswagen AG Scania AB 
04/29/2014 Sollers PAO UAZ 
07/02/2014 Volkswagen AG PACCAR Inc 
07/17/2014 Volkswagen AG Fiat SpA 
03/13/2015 Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV General Motors Co 
12/11/2015 Nissan Motor Co Ltd Regie Natle Des Usines 
01/29/2016 Toyota Motor Corp Daihatsu Motor Co Ltd 
05/12/2016 Nissan Motor Co Ltd Mitsubishi Motors Corp 
08/04/2017 Toyota Motor Corp Mazda Motor Corp 
09/19/2017 Regie Natle Des Usines AVTOVAZ PAO 
03/07/2018 Nissan Motor Co Ltd Regie Natle Des Usines 
03/29/2018 Nissan Motor Co Ltd Regie Natle Des Usines 
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Table A 8. Vertical M&As used for event period analysis 
Vertical M&As 
Date announced Acquiror name Target name 
03/31/2008 Kinetic Motor Co Ltd Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd 
04/30/2008 Tognum AG Daimler AG 
05/05/2008 Avtodizel PAO GAZ 
05/14/2008 Kinetic Motor Co Ltd Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd 
07/30/2008 Soosung Lift Mfg Co Ltd THACO 
07/30/2008 S&T Motors Co Ltd S&T Motiv Co Ltd 
02/09/2009 Fras-Le SA Randon SA Implementos 
07/10/2009 ZMZ UAZ 
01/14/2010 Aichi Machine Industry Co Ltd Nissan Motor Co Ltd 
03/31/2010 Metalart Corp Daihatsu Motor Co Ltd 
07/13/2010 Tognum AG Daimler Ag 
07/22/2010 Swaraj Engines Ltd Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd 
08/12/2010 Saeron Automotive Corp Mando Corp 
08/13/2010 New Name Tech Co Ltd AD Motors Co Ltd 
09/08/2010 Hinduja Foundries Ltd Ashok Leyland Ltd 
11/26/2010 New Name Tech Co Ltd AD Motors Co Ltd 
12/16/2010 CNH Global NV Fiat Industrial SpA 
01/28/2011 Glovis Co Ltd Hyundai Motor Co Ltd 
02/09/2011 EPC Industrie Ltd Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd 
02/25/2011 SGL Carbon SE Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 
03/23/2011 Apple International Co Ltd Isuzu Motors Ltd 
07/07/2011 HellermannTyton Group PLC Delphi Automotive Plc 
07/19/2011 Sirit Inc Federal Signal Corp 
11/18/2011 BTC Korea Co Ltd SJM Holdings Co Ltd 
12/16/2011 Astra Otoparts Tbk PT PT Astra International Tbk 
02/17/2012 KAMAZ Daimler AG 
02/24/2012 Punjab Tractors Ltd Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd 
04/23/2012 Renk AG Volkswagen AG 
05/30/2012 KAMAZ Daimler AG 
06/09/2012 Deutz AG Volvo AB 
12/18/2012 SJM Co Ltd SJM Holdings Co Ltd 
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04/10/2013 SGL Carbon SE Volkswagen AG 
11/08/2013 S&T Corp S&T Motiv Co Ltd 
12/08/2014 EPC Industrie Ltd Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd 
12/19/2014 Shiroki Corp Aisin Seiki Co Ltd 
12/19/2014 Valeo SA Ashok Leyland Ltd 
04/23/2015 Ichitan Co Ltd Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd 
07/30/2015 Huayu Automotive Sys Co Ltd SAIC Motor Corp Ltd 
12/18/2015 Futaba Industrial Co Ltd Toyota Motor Corp 
05/23/2016 GKN PLC SAIC Motor Corp Ltd 
09/14/2016 S&T Corp S&T Motiv Co Ltd 
04/28/2017 ALBERT Inc Toyota Motor Corp 
09/28/2017 Sanoh Industrial Co Ltd Suzuki Motor Corp 
12/07/2017 Avtodizel PAO GAZ 
03/07/2018 Delphi Corp General Motors Corp 
05/15/2018 Tech Mahindra Ltd Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd 
09/06/2018 Hydrogenics Corp Motors Liquidation Co 
10/25/2018 WSI Industries Inc Polaris Industries Inc 
 
 
